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Incorporating new information into a knowledge base is an important problem which has
been widely investigated. In this paper, we study this problem in a formal framework
for reasoning about actions and change. In this framework, action domains are described
in an action language whose semantics is based on the notion of causality. Unlike
the formalisms considered in the related work, this language allows straightforward
representation of non-deterministic effects and indirect effects of (possibly concurrent)
actions, as well as state constraints; therefore, the updates can be more general than
elementary statements. The expressivity of this formalism allows us to study the update
of an action domain description with a more general approach compared to related work.
First of all, we consider the update of an action description with respect to further
criteria, for instance, by ensuring that the updated description entails some observations,
assertions, or general domain properties that constitute further constraints that are not
expressible in an action description in general. Moreover, our framework allows us to
discriminate amongst alternative updates of action domain descriptions and to single out
a most preferable one, based on a given preference relation possibly dependent on the
speciﬁed criteria. We study semantic and computational aspects of the update problem,
and establish basic properties of updates as well as a decomposition theorem that gives
rise to a divide and conquer approach to updating action descriptions under certain
conditions. Furthermore, we study the computational complexity of decision problems
around computing solutions, both for the generic setting and for two particular preference
relations, viz. set-inclusion and weight-based preference. While deciding the existence of
solutions and recognizing solutions are PSPACE-complete problems in general, the problems
fall back into the polynomial hierarchy under restrictions on the additional constraints. We
ﬁnally discuss methods to compute solutions and approximate solutions (which disregard
preference). Our results provide a semantic and computational basis for developing systems
that incorporate new information into action domain descriptions in an action language, in
the presence of additional constraints.
© 2010 Elsevier B.V.
1. Introduction
As we live in a world where knowledge and information is in ﬂux, updating knowledge bases is an important issue
that has been widely studied in the area of knowledge representation and reasoning (see e.g. [67,12,20,61] and references
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information, be it aﬃrmative or prohibitive, which are based on different formal and philosophical underpinnings, cf. [67,
39,57]. It appears that there is no general purpose method that would work well in all settings, which is partly due to the
fact that an update method is also dependent to some extent on the application domain.
In particular, in reasoning about actions and change, the dynamicity of the world is a part of the domain theory, and
requires special attention in update methods. For various approaches to formal action theories, including the prominent
situation calculus, event calculus, and action languages that emerged from the research on non-monotonic reasoning, the
problem of change has been widely studied and different methods have been proposed (see [64] for background and refer-
ences, and Section 8.1 for a more detailed discussion).
To give a simple example, consider an agent having the following knowledge, KTV , about a TV with remote control:
(TV1) If the power is off, pushing the power button on the TV turns the power on.
(TV2) If the power is on, pushing the power button on the TV turns the power off.
(TV3) The TV is on whenever the power is on.1
(TV4) The TV is off whenever the power is off.
Now assume that the agent does not know how a remote control works (e.g., she does not know the effect of pushing the
power button on the remote control). Suppose that later she obtains the following information, KRC , about remote controls:
(RC1) If the power is on and the TV is off, pushing the power button on the remote control turns the TV on.
(RC2) If the TV is on, pushing the power button on the remote control turns the TV off.
The task is now to incorporate this new knowledge into the current knowledge base KTV . In this particular case, this
seems unproblematic, as upon simply adding KRC to KTV the resulting stock of knowledge is consistent; in general, however,
it might be inconsistent, and a major issue is how to overcome this inconsistency.
We study the incorporation problem in the context of action languages [30]. In these formalisms, actions and change are
described by “causal laws.” For instance, in the action language C [32], the direct effect of the action of pushing the power
button on the TV, stated in (TV1), is described by the causal law
caused PowerON after PushPBTV ∧ ¬PowerON, (1)
which expresses that this action, represented by PushPBTV , causes the value of the ﬂuent PowerON to change from false to
true; the indirect effect of this action that is stated in (TV3) is described by the causal law
caused TvON if PowerON, (2)
which expresses that if the ﬂuent PowerON is caused to be true, then the ﬂuent TvON is caused to be true as well.
Action description languages are quite expressive to easily handle non-determinism, concurrency, ramiﬁcations, qualiﬁca-
tions, etc. The meaning of an action description can be represented by a “transition diagram”—a directed graph whose nodes
correspond to states and whose edges correspond to action occurrences; Fig. 1 below (Section 2) shows an example. There
are reasoning systems, like CCalc2 and DLVK ,3 that accept domain descriptions in an action language, like C or K respec-
tively, and support various kinds of reasoning tasks over these descriptions, including planning, prediction and postdiction
in CCcalc and computing different kinds of plans in DLVK .
As far as action languages are concerned, the update problem was studied to a remarkably little extent. For the basic
action language A (see [30]), which is far less expressive than C , the update problem has been considered, e.g., in [44,
47]. Both works focused on updates that consist of elementary statements (i.e., essentially facts) over time, and presented
speciﬁc update methods, focusing on the contents of the knowledge base. We address the update problem from a more
general perspective in the following ways:
• We consider a richer language (i.e., a fragment of C) to study the update problem, and updates are represented in
terms of a set of arbitrary causal laws.
• We view the update problem from a more general perspective. Sometimes, ensuring consistency is not suﬃcient: we
might want to ensure also that the updated action description entails some scenarios, conditions, or general properties of
the domain that cannot be expressed by causal laws. In our update framework, such further knowledge could be taken into
account.
For example, for the effective use of the TV system in the above scenario, the following constraint might be imposed:
(C) Pushing the power button on the remote control is always possible.4
1 Note that the statement is wrong; its defectiveness is observed and resolved upon update.
2 http://www.cs.utexas.edu/users/tag/cc/.
3 http://www.dbai.tuwien.ac.at/proj/dlv/K/.
4 Note the conceptual difference between (C) and (TV2): (C) expresses an executability condition, whereas (TV2) captures a causal relationship.
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button on the remote control is not possible, since (RC2) and (TV3) contradict. The question is then how the agent can
update KTV by incorporating KRC relative to (C); note that (C) is not expressible by causal laws in the action language C .
To represent constraints like (C), we use formulas for “queries” in action languages like in [30]; here, the formula
ALWAYS executable {PushPBRC} (3)
has to evaluate to true, where {PushPBRC} stands for the concrete action of pushing the power button on the remote control.
Similarly, consider the following scenario that we might want the updated action description to entail:
(S) Sometimes, when the power is on, pushing the power button on TV turns the power off, and after that if we push the
power button on the TV then the power is on again.
This scenario cannot be expressed by means of causal laws either; however, it can be expressed by a formula
SOMETIMES evolves PowerON; {PushPBTV};
¬PowerON; {PushPBTV}; PowerON.
• Sometimes, an action description can be updated in several ways. Our framework allows us to discriminate amongst
alternatives and to single out a most preferable candidate as the result, based on a given preference relation possibly
dependent on the additional constraint formulas.
In this paper, we consider a generic framework for incorporating new causal laws into an existing action description,
that takes into account the constraint formulas to be satisﬁed in the end. We thus take here the stance that the causal laws,
which have been designed by the user or the knowledge engineer, are to be modiﬁed, while constraint formulas are not
subject to change (they might capture indisputable properties of the domain); a violation of constraints might be tolerated,
though, if indicated by the user. Our main contributions can be summarized as follows:
(1) We introduce a formal notion of an action update problem, which is, given action descriptions D and I , and a set C
of constraint formulas, to determine a (possibly new) action description D ′ which incorporates I into D . While D and I are
in (a canonical subset of) C , we describe conditions like (C) and scenarios like (S) by “constraints” using formulas from an
action query language, similar to the one in [30]. In a more ﬁne-grained treatment, D is split into an unmodiﬁable part, Du ,
and a modiﬁable part, Dm , while C is split into obligatory constraints, Co , (which must hold under all circumstances) and
preference constraints, Cp (which ideally should hold, but might be violated).
A solution to an action update problem is then deﬁned in terms of an action description D ′ that consists of I and
statements from D such that Co is satisﬁed by D ′; as, in general, different candidates D ′ are possible, we use a (strict)
preference relation C over action descriptions5 in order to discriminate amongst alternatives and to single out a most
preferable candidate D ′ as the result. Here the subscript C indicates that the preference relation is possibly dependent
on the set C of constraints. Such a preference relation can be deﬁned in different ways, in terms of syntactic conditions
(e.g., the set of causal laws in an action description), or semantic conditions (e.g., the presence or absence of paths in the
transition diagram).
(2) We investigate semantic properties of action updates, and establish some basic properties regarding solution pref-
erence, and special forms of updates, which serve as tests for the suitability of the notions proposed. We furthermore
determine conditions under which computing a solution to an action update problem can be structurally decomposed, such
that a divide-and-conquer approach becomes feasible. In particular, this is possible if the action description and the con-
straints can be split into disjoint parts that interfere in a benign way, and if the preference ordering can be gracefully
decomposed along this split.
(3) We study the computational complexity of the action update problem, where we consider the generic setting (making
some assumptions about the cost of deciding whether the constraints C are satisﬁed by an action description D , denoted
D | C , and whether D C D ′ holds given D and D ′), as well as some natural instances. Among the latter are those where
the preference relation C is ordinary set-inclusion and where it is weight-based relative to satisﬁed constraints. Under
the assumption that testing D | C and D C D ′ is feasible in polynomial space, deciding the existence of some solution
to an action update problem turns out to be PSPACE-complete in general, and also verifying a given solution candidate has
this complexity. However, the complexity of both problems falls back into the polynomial hierarchy, if deciding D | C and
D C D ′ is located there, and is located at most one level higher up there; we recall here that deciding the consistency
of an action description in C is intractable in general (and NP-complete for the canonical fragment of our concern). Given
that the test D | C and D C D ′ is polynomial, deciding solution existence is NP-complete and thus not harder than the
consistency problem, and recognizing a given solution is only mildly harder.
(4) We discuss methods for computing solutions and “pre-solutions” which approximate them, by disregarding solution
preference. As for solutions, we focus on set-inclusion and one particular weight-based comparison, as preference relations
5 That is, C is irreﬂexive and transitive.
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over an action description that is constructed from the problem input; here, evaluating constraint formulas can be exploited
to test given candidates.
(5) Finally, we show the applicability of our algorithm based on the computation of pre-solutions, and the usefulness of
the theoretical results on the decomposability of the update problem, in the context of the Zoo World, which is an action
domain proposed by Erik Sandewall in his Logic Modelling Workshop.6 The Zoo World consists of several cages and the
exterior, gates between them, and animals of several species, including humans, and its actions include moving within and
between cages, opening and closing gates, and mounting and riding animals; a description of this domain in the action
language C+ was given in [1].
Our results go signiﬁcantly beyond previous results in the literature (see Section 8.1), and provide a semantic and com-
putational basis for developing systems that incorporate new information into action descriptions in an action language,
in the presence of further constraints that can be expressed as formulas to be entailed by the updated description. Our
generic framework can be instantiated to different settings, which reﬂect different intuitions or criteria for solution prefer-
ence. It thus provides a ﬂexible tool for modeling action update. As a byproduct, we obtain decomposition results of action
descriptions that emerge from special cases of action update instances, which are interesting in their own right.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. In the next section, we provide preliminaries about transition diagrams,
action languages, and constraint formulas as needed for the problem setting. After that, we deﬁne in Section 3 the update
problem in a generic framework and brieﬂy introduce a syntactic and a semantic instance of it. In Section 4, we study some
semantic properties of updates, including possible decompositions. After that, we turn to computational issues. In Section 5,
we characterize the computational complexity of problems around updates, and in Section 6 we provide algorithms for
computing updates. Example applications in the Zoo World are considered in Section 7. After a discussion of related work
and further aspects of the problem in Section 8, we conclude with a summary and issues for further research.
2. Preliminaries
We describe action domains and the updates in an action description language, a fragment of C [32], by “causal laws.”
Therefore, in the following, ﬁrst we describe the syntax and the semantics of the action description language, which is
deﬁned by means of “transition systems.”
While updating an action domain description, we sometimes would like ensure that the updated description entails
some conditions or scenarios. Most of the time such scenarios or conditions are not expressible in the action language. We
describe them as constraints using formulas from an action query language, like the one in [30]. Therefore, we also describe
the action query language we use, and deﬁne satisfaction of a constraint by an action domain description.
Finally, we give sample constraints that are useful in action updates but cannot be represented in the action description
language. We also discuss and emphasize the necessity of a query language in addition to the description language.
2.1. Transition diagrams
We start with a (propositional) action signature that consists of a set F of ﬂuent names, and a set A of action names.
A literal is an expression of the form P or ¬P , where P is a ﬂuent name. An action is a truth-valued function on A, denoted
by the set of action names that are mapped to t . Thus, action names represent basic (atomic) actions, while a (compound)
action is identiﬁed with the basic actions taking place at the same time, providing an intuitive representation of both,
atomic and concurrent, actions.
Deﬁnition 1. (See [30].) A (propositional) transition diagram of an action signature L = 〈F,A〉 consists of a set S of states, a
function V :F× S → { f , t}, and a subset R ⊆ S×2A × S of transitions. We say that V (P , s) is the value of P in s. The states s′
such that 〈s, A, s′〉 ∈ R are the possible results of the execution of the action A in the state s. We say that A is executable in s
if at least one such state s′ exists; and that A is deterministic in s if there is at most one such s′ .
A transition diagram can be thought of as a labeled directed graph. Every state s is represented by a vertex labeled with
the function P → V (P , s) from ﬂuent names to truth values. Every triple 〈s, A, s′〉 ∈ R is represented by an edge leading
from s to s′ and labeled A. An example of a transition diagram is shown in Fig. 1.
2.2. Action description languages
We consider the prime subset of the action description language C [32] that consists of two kinds of expressions (called
causal laws): static laws of the form
caused L if G, (4)
6 http://www.ida.liu.se/ext/etai/lmw/.
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Fig. 2. An action description for KTV .
where L is a literal and G is a propositional combination of ﬂuent names, and dynamic laws of the form
caused L if G after H, (5)
where L and G are as above, and H is a propositional combination of ﬂuent names and action names. In (4) and (5) the
part if G can be dropped if G is True.
An action description is a set of causal laws. For instance, the knowledge base about a TV system, D , of the agent in the
previous section, can be described by causal laws in Fig. 2. An expression of the form
inertial L1, . . . , Lk (6)
stands for the causal laws
caused Li if Li after Li (1 i  k)
describing that the value of the ﬂuent Li stays the same unless changed by an action.
The meaning of an action description can be represented by a transition diagram. Let D be an action description with a
signature L = 〈F,A〉. Then the transition diagram 〈S, V , R〉 described by D , denoted by T (D), is deﬁned as follows:
(i) S is the set of all interpretations s of F such that, for every static law (4) in D , s satisﬁes G ⊃ L,
(ii) V (P , s) = s(P ),
(iii) R is the set of all triples 〈s, A, s′〉 such that s′ is the unique interpretation of F which satisﬁes the heads L of all
• static laws (4) in D for which s′ satisﬁes G , and
• dynamic laws (5) in D for which s′ satisﬁes G and s ∪ A satisﬁes H .
The laws included in (iii) above are those that are applicable to the transition from s to s′ caused by executing A: the static
causal laws make sure that s′ is a state, and handles the ramiﬁcations and the qualiﬁcations of A; whereas the dynamic
causal laws handle the preconditions and the direct effects of A.
Action language C is based on the “principle of universal causation,” according to which every fact that obtains is
caused. In the deﬁnition above, the condition that s′ is the only interpretation satisfying the heads of the applicable causal
laws ensures this. For instance, the transition diagram described by the action description for KTV in Fig. 2 is presented in
Fig. 1. Consider the transition 〈{¬PowerON, ¬TvON}, {PushPBTV }, {PowerON,TvON}〉. The causal laws that are applicable to
this transition are
caused PowerON after PushPBTV ∧ ¬PowerON
caused TvON if PowerON.
Here {PowerON,TvON} is the only interpretation that satisﬁes the heads of these causal laws, i.e., {PowerON,TvON}.
Now consider the triple 〈{¬PowerON,¬TvON}, { }, {PowerON,TvON}〉. There is only one of the two causal laws above
applicable to this triple, viz. the second. There are two interpretations that satisfy the head of this causal law: {PowerON,
TvON} and {¬PowerON,TvON}. In other words, no causal law provides a causal explanation for PowerON. Therefore, this
triple is not a transition.
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In the following, we suppose that an action description D consists of two parts: Du (unmodiﬁable causal laws) and Dm
(modiﬁable causal laws). Therefore, we sometimes denote an action description D as Du ∪ Dm .
2.3. Why action languages?
In this work, we consider action languages to formalize action domains. There are several reasons for this decision.
First of all, action description languages, like C , are quite expressive to easily handle non-determinism, concurrency,
ramiﬁcations, defaults, qualiﬁcations, state constraints, etc. For instance, we can express that tossing a coin may lead to
Heads or Tails by the causal laws
caused Heads if Heads after Toss
caused ¬Heads if ¬Heads after Toss.
Concurrency is allowed unless no qualiﬁcation constraint is violated or unless explicitly stated otherwise by a causal law
like
caused False afterMoveRight ∧MoveLeft.
The commonsense law of inertia is immediately expressed by causal laws of the form (6). A direct effect of turning on the
power is that the power is on; a ramiﬁcation of turning on the power is that TV is on. We can express such a ramiﬁcation
by the causal law
caused TvON if PowerON.
We can describe that a spring-loaded door is by default closed by the causal laws:
caused Open if Open.
Second, there are reasoning systems, like CCalc and DLVK , that accept domain descriptions in an action language, like C or
K respectively, and allow various kinds of reasoning tasks over these descriptions.
Third, there is a large amount of theoretical and application-oriented work on action languages, including our earlier
work on planning and monitoring. On the other hand, as discussed brieﬂy in the introduction, the update problem was
studied to a remarkably little extent in the context of action languages. This paper not only extends our earlier work to take
updates into account but also fulﬁlls the need for a general approach to updates in action languages.
2.4. Expressive constraints
Once we describe an action domain, we may want check whether this domain description entails some observations of
the world, assertions about the effects of the execution of actions, or even some scenarios. Similarly as in [18], we express
such conditions as constraints using formulas from an action query language, like the one in [30]. After that, we can check
whether a given action description satisﬁes a given constraint using reasoning systems, e.g. CCalc (cf. the examples in
Appendix C).
Now constraint formulas are formally deﬁned as follows.7
An open constraint is either (a) a static constraint of the form
holds F , (7)
where F is a ﬂuent formula, or (b) a dynamic constraint of the form
necessarily Q after A1; . . . ; An, (8)
where Q is an open constraint and each Ai is an action8; or (c) any propositional combination of open constraints. An
existential constraint is an expression of the form
SOMETIMES Q , (9)
where Q is an open constraint; a universal constraint is of the form
ALWAYS Q , (10)
where Q is an open constraint. A constraint q is a propositional combination of existential constraints and universal con-
straints.
7 In action query languages, “constraints” as here etc. are called “queries;” the former term is more appealing here as satisfaction is required.
8 This amounts to [Q ]A1; . . . ; An in dynamic logic [37]; however, we stick here to the commonly used syntax of action queries.
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constraint, then k = 0; if q is a dynamic constraint of the form (8), then k = kQ + 1, where kQ is the maximal nesting
depth of dynamic constraints in Q ; if q is a Boolean combination of open constraints, then k is a maximal element from
the set of maximal nesting depths of dynamic constraints of its subformulas. This deﬁnition is easily extended to (general)
constraints. For an existential (universal) constraint of the form (9) (resp. of the form (10)), its maximal nesting depth of
dynamic constraints is kQ , i.e., the maximal nesting depth of dynamic constraints in Q . For a propositional combination of
existential and universal constraints, its maximal nesting depth of dynamic constraints is a maximal element from the set
of maximal nesting depths of dynamic constraints of its subformulas.
As for the semantics, let T = 〈S, V , R〉 be a transition diagram, with a set S of states, a value function V mapping, at
each state s, every ﬂuent P to a truth value, and a set R of transitions. A history of T of length n is a sequence
s0, A1, s1, . . . , sn−1, An, sn (11)
where each 〈si, Ai+1, si+1〉 (0  i < n) is in R . We say that a state s ∈ S satisﬁes an open constraint Q ′ of form (7)
(resp. (8)) relative to T (denoted T , s | Q ′), if the interpretation P → V (P , s) satisﬁes F (resp. if, for every history
h = s0, A1, s1, . . . , sn−1, An, sn of T which is of length n and such that s = s0, open constraint Q is satisﬁed at state sn).
For other forms of open constraints Q , satisfaction is deﬁned by the truth tables of propositional logic. If T is described by
an action description D , then the satisfaction relation between s and an open constraint Q can be denoted by D, s | Q as
well.
Note that, for every state s and for every ﬂuent formula F ,
D, s | holds F ⇐⇒ D, s | ¬holds ¬F .
For every state s, every ﬂuent formula F , and every action sequence A1, . . . , An (n 1), if
D, s | necessarily (holds F ) after A1; . . . ; An
then
D, s | ¬necessarily (¬holds F ) after A1; . . . ; An.
We say that D satisﬁes a constraint q (denoted D | q) if one of the following holds:
• q is an existential constraint (9) and D, s | Q for some state s ∈ S;
• q is a universal constraint (10) and D, s | Q for every state s ∈ S;
• q = ¬q′ and D | q′;
• q = q1 ∧ q2 and D | q1 and D | q2; or
• q = q1 ∨ q2 and D | q1 or D | q2.
For every open constraint Q ,
D | SOMETIMES Q iff D | ¬ALWAYS ¬Q .
For a set C of constraints, we say that D satisﬁes C (denoted D|C ) if D satisﬁes every constraint in C . Consider, e.g., the
action description presented in Fig. 2. It does not satisfy any set of constraints containing
ALWAYS necessarily (holds ¬TvON) after {PushPBRC}
because this constraint is not satisﬁed at the state {TvON,PowerON}; but, it satisﬁes the constraints:
ALWAYS holds PowerON ≡ TvON, (12)
ALWAYS holds PowerON ∧ TvON ⊃ ¬necessarily (holds TvON) after {PushPBTV}. (13)
In the rest of the paper, an expression of the form
possibly Q after A1; . . . ; An,
where Q is an open constraint and each Ai is an action, stands for the dynamic constraint
¬necessarily ¬Q after A1; . . . ; An;
an expression of the form
evolves F0; A1; F1; . . . ; Fn−1; An; Fn,
where each Fi is a ﬂuent formula, and each Ai is an action, stands for
holds F0 ∧ possibly
(
holds F1 ∧ possibly (holds F2 ∧ . . .) after A2
)
after A1;
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executable A1; . . . ; An
where each Ai is an action, stands for
possibly True after A1; . . . ; An.
We sometimes drop holds from static constraints appearing in dynamic constraints.
2.4.1. Examples
To get a better intuition about the capability of constraints, we give some examples of properties that can be expressed
by them.
• Existence of certain states, transitions, and histories: For instance, we can express the existence of states where a formula
F holds by means of the constraint
SOMETIMES holds F .
Similarly, we can express the existence of a transition from some state where a formula F holds to another state where
a formula F ′ holds, by the execution of an action A:
SOMETIMES holds F ∧ possibly F ′ after A.
In general, the existence of a history (11) such that, for each si of the history, the interpretation P → V (P , si) satisﬁes
some formula Fi is expressed by the constraint:
SOMETIMES evolves F0; A1; F1; . . . ; Fn−1; An; Fn.
For instance, the constraint
SOMETIMES evolves PowerON; {PushPBTV};
¬PowerON; {PushPBTV};PowerON
describes the presence of the following history in Fig. 1:
{PowerON,TvON}, {PushPBTV},
{¬PowerON,¬TvON}, {PushPBTV}, {PowerON,TvON}.
• (Non-)executability of an action: Like in [16], executability of an action sequence A1, . . . , An (n 1) at every state can be
described by
ALWAYS executable A1; . . . ; An.
That no action is possible at a state where formula F holds is expressed by
SOMETIMES holds F ∧
∧
A∈2A
necessarily False after A.
• Mandatory and possible effects of actions: Like in [16], mandatory effects of a sequence A1, . . . , An (n 1) of actions in a
given context are described by
ALWAYS holds G ⊃ necessarily F after A1; . . . ; An;
and possible effects of a sequence of actions in a context by
ALWAYS holds G ⊃ possibly F after A1; . . . ; An.
In these constraints, F describes the effects and G the context.
2.4.2. Constraints vs. causal laws
In all action languages [30], queries have been expressed in a language different from the action description languages.
As we consider constraints as queries that evaluate to true, it may look suggestive to merge causal laws and constraints
into a single set of formulas that constitute an action description. However, constraints and causal laws are conceptually
different: causal laws are axioms that describe action domains in a generative manner (in particular, in action language C via
causation), whereas constraints express conditions (which may also refer to time steps) that we would like to ensure about
an action domain; they thus serve for eliminating unwanted models. In other words, constraints restrict the possibilities for
an action description, but they are non-constructive in the sense that they do not causally generate transitions. The latter
however is at the heart of C and many other action languages: each edge 〈s, A, s′〉 in the transition diagram is causally
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laws that “ﬁre,” i.e., the causal laws that are applicable to 〈s, A, s′〉.
For instance, if the action description consists of the only causal law
caused G after A1 ∧ F ,
where every ﬂuent is inertial, then the transition diagram has the edge 〈{F ,¬G}, {A1}, {F ,G}〉, i.e., we can get from the
state s = {F ,¬G} to the state s′ = {F ,G} with the occurrence of the action {A1}. However, the transition diagram does not
have the edge 〈∅, {A1}, {F ,G}〉. If instead of the causal law above, we consider the constraint
ALWAYS holds F ⊃ necessarily G after A1;
which is similar to the causal law, then both 〈{F ,¬G}, {A1}, {F ,G}〉 and 〈∅, {A1}, {F ,G}〉 would be included in the transition
diagram (since F is false w.r.t. s = ∅, the implication is true).
Although in some cases a constraint may be expressed by an equivalent causal law (or multiple such laws), this is not
always the case. Moreover, the meaning of a set of causal laws is described by a set of nodes and a set of edges that form
a transition system, where each of these edges expresses a causal relationship (which generates the edge), whereas roughly
speaking, the meaning of a constraint is described by a set of paths in the transition diagram without such a causal relation.
In other words, constraints might describe conditions characterizing subgraphs of a transition diagram. Consequently, some
constraints cannot be expressed as causal laws, for instance “existential constraints” like the constraint
SOMETIMES possibly F after A,
the constraint (21), and similar constraints in Section 2.4.1. They cannot be expressed via causal laws, as the latter are
inherently universal statements. Also “universal” constraints like
ALWAYS (possibly F after A)∧ (possibly ¬F after A)
(which implicitly enforce existence of causal transitions) are diﬃcult to express via causal laws. Another aspect is that
constraints allow us to talk about sequences of actions, while causal laws do not.
Due to the syntactic and the semantic differences between causal laws and queries, the reasoning systems (like CCalc)
based on action languages also have different syntax for query formulas (cf. Appendix C); hence a difference in practice
as well. For instance, in reasoning systems, queries can be used to describe reasoning tasks (like temporal projection or
planning) about a given action domain.
Although there are some formalisms (like situation calculus as in [60], dynamic logic as in [37], or answer set program-
ming as in [48]) that can be used to describe both axioms and constraints, a distinction between formalisms to express
axioms and constraints is not unusual in other areas either. Consider, for instance, the description of a circuit in propo-
sitional logic and the conditions we want to check about this circuit that are expressed in a temporal logic [25]. Also,
consider ontologies described in ontology description languages (like RDF), and constraints described in ontology query
languages (like SPARQL).
The differences between causal laws and query formulas also affect the computational eﬃciency of reasoning systems.
For instance, given a domain description and a query, CCalc checks whether the query is entailed by the domain description
as follows:
(1) it transforms the causal laws into a propositional theory ΓD ,
(2) it transforms the negated query into a propositional theory ΓP ,
(3) it checks whether ΓD ∪ ΓP is satisﬁable;
(4) if ΓD ∪ ΓP is unsatisﬁable, it returns Yes;
(5) otherwise, it returns No and presents a counter example extracted from a satisfying interpretation for ΓD ∪ ΓP .
The transformations in the ﬁrst two steps are different: the one in 1) is based on literal completion, whereas the one in 2)
is based on a simpler procedure (see [31] for a detailed description). Such a difference allows one to check the entailment
of other queries without executing the ﬁrst step again. If we had described a constraint by means of causal laws, then in
general we would have to transform the union of the causal laws and the constraint into a propositional theory; for large
domain descriptions, like the Zoo World, such a bulk transformation would lead to ineﬃcient computations.
3. Problem description
In this section, we provide a formal description of the update problem, and its solution, as well as a weaker form of
solution, called pre-solution. The basic problem is a theory change problem, i.e., a problem of incorporating new information
into an existing stock of knowledge (cf. Sections 4.2 and 8.2 for more detailed discussions of relations to well-known work
in this area). Since we study the incorporation problem in the context of an action language, we consider single causal laws
as the atomic entities that are subject to change (for a discussion how to reﬁne this further, see Section 8.3). In addition
to causal laws for incorporation, the new information may contain constraints that characterize intended properties of
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Concerning solutions of the problem, we aim at keeping the size of the search space practically reasonable, as well as at
building on natural analogies with change operators developed in other areas of database or AI research (cf. [67,61,57] and
references therein).
Informally, we deﬁne an Action Description Update (ADU) problem by an action description D = Du ∪ Dm , a set I of causal
laws (a partial action description), a set C = Co ∪ Cp of constraints, and a preference relation C over action descriptions.
Here Du and Dm are the unmodiﬁable (protected) and the modiﬁable part of D , respectively, and I is the update that has
to be incorporated. The constraints in Co are “hard (obligatory) constraints” that have to be satisﬁed in an acceptable action
description, while the constraints in Cp are “soft (preference) constraints” that might be accounted for by the preference
relation C . In the latter, D C D ′ expresses that D is less preferable compared to D ′ .
Deﬁnition 2 (Action description update). Given an action description D = Du ∪ Dm , a set I of causal laws (a partial action
description), a set C = Co ∪ Cp of constraints, and a preference relation C over action descriptions, all over the same
signature L, an action description D ′ accomplishes an (action description) update of D by I relative to C , if
(i) D ′ is consistent,
(ii) Du ∪ I ⊆ D ′ ⊆ D ∪ I ,
(iii) D ′ | Co ,
(iv) there is no consistent action description D ′′ such that Du ∪ I ⊆ D ′′ ⊆ D ∪ I , D ′′ | Co , and D ′ C D ′′ .9
Such a D ′ is called a solution to the ADU problem (D, I,C,C ). If an action description D ′ satisﬁes (i)–(iii), then we call D ′
a pre-solution to the ADU problem (D, I,C,C ).
Condition (i) expresses that an action description update, modeling a dynamic domain, such as the TV system in Sec-
tion 1, must have a state. According to Condition (ii), new knowledge about the world and the invariable part of the existing
action description are kept, and the causal laws in the variable part are considered to be either “correct” or “wrong,” and in
the latter case simply disposed.
Condition (iii) imposes semantical constraints Co on D ′ , which comprise further knowledge about the action domain
gained, e.g., from experience. It is important to note that C can be modiﬁed later for another action description update (as
will be discussed below).
Finally, Condition (iv) picks the most preferred action description among the ones for which Conditions (i)–(iii) are
satisﬁed.
In an ADU problem, the preference relation can be described in various ways. For instance, it can be deﬁned in terms
of syntactic conditions, like simple set inclusion. If we deﬁne C to be ⊂, then an action description D is less preferable
than an action description D ′ if D ⊂ D ′ . Alternatively, the preference relation C can be deﬁned in terms of semantic
conditions. For instance, once a weight is assigned to each action description with respect to some semantic measure (e.g.,
the number of certain paths present in the transition diagram of the description) by a function weight, we can take C
to be an operator <weight comparing the weights of the action descriptions; then an action description D is less preferable
than an action description D ′ if D <weight D ′ .
In the literature, two kinds of changes that incorporate new information into a knowledge base have been identiﬁed, viz.
revision (which adds more precise knowledge about the domain) and update (which is a change of the world per se) [66],
which should be governed by different sets of postulates in axiomatic approaches like the AGM theory [2] and the KM
theory [39]. Our notion of ADU has more of a revision ﬂavor, but we do not govern it with AGM or KM postulates, as the
formalism does not satisfy the prerequisites; see Section 8.2 for more discussion. However, the constraints C can be adjusted
if the nature of the change I is known. In case of a revision, C should reasonably contain all conditions corresponding to
observations made about the domain, while other conditions may be kept or dropped; on the other hand, if I is a change
of the world per se, then conditions corresponding to observations might be dropped.
Eventually we remark that, in descriptive domains, like physical domains, one might carry out tests and collect respective
results (observations) in order to ﬁnd out erroneous causal laws. In this case, the update problem would be rather viewed
as a diagnosis problem. Note however, that such an approach hinges on the possibility to make observations for learning
causal relationships. In contrast, our approach is intended to also allow for normative (artiﬁcial) worlds modeled as action
descriptions (e.g., agent systems, games, protocols), where the world is designed, rather than perceived. In such domains,
and likewise for physical worlds that are not observable (where one is impeded to make observations for whatever reason),
it is not feasible to treat the update problem as a diagnosis problem.
9 Note that soft constraints Cp are used implicitly in this deﬁnition, since the preference relation C is one in which C = Co ∪ Cp is explicitly known as
parameter.
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Fig. 4. Transition diagram described by D ∪ I of Example 1.
3.1. Examples
The following is an example of an ADU problem with the syntax-based preference relation above.
Example 1. Let D be the action description for KTV in Fig. 2, i.e., D = Du ∪ Dm with
Du = {caused PowerON after PushPBTV ∧ ¬PowerON,
caused ¬PowerON after PushPBTV ∧ PowerON,
inertial PowerON,¬PowerON,TvON,¬TvON}
and Dm = {caused TvON if PowerON, caused ¬TvON if ¬PowerON}, and let I be the set of causal laws for KRC in Fig. 3:
caused TvON after PushPBRC ∧ PowerOn∧ ¬TvON,
caused ¬TvON after PushPBRC ∧ TvON.
Furthermore, let C = Co contain besides constraints (3) and (13):
ALWAYS executable {PushPBRC},
ALWAYS holds PowerON ∧ TvON ⊃
¬necessarily (holds TvON) after {PushPBTV},
also the constraint
ALWAYS executable {PushPBTV}, (14)
and take (strict) set-inclusion (⊂) as the preference relation C . The transition diagram described by D ∪ I is shown in
Fig. 4. Here we can see that, at the state where both PowerON and TvON are mapped to t , the action PushPBRC is not
executable. Therefore, D ∪ I is not a solution to the ADU problem (D, I,C,C ). In fact, a solution is obtained by dropping
the static law (2), i.e., caused TvON if PowerON, from D ∪ I .
For an instance of a semantic deﬁnition of C , consider the following setting based on weights that are assigned to
constraints on C (i.e., weighted constraints in [18]). We deﬁne the weight of an action description D relative to a set C of
constraints, and a weight function f :C →R mapping each constraint in C to a real number by
weightq(D) =
∑
c∈C,D|c
f (c).
Intuitively, the weight of an action description deﬁned relative to the weights of constraints encodes to what extent the
set C of given preferable constraints is satisﬁed. (Note that f can easily express a threshold function as well.) With this
deﬁnition, the more the highly preferred constraints are satisﬁed, the more preferred the action description is.
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ALWAYS holds PowerON ∧ TvON ⊃
¬necessarily (holds TvON) after {PushPBTV}.
Suppose that the preference relation C is deﬁned in terms of a weight function on constraints (i.e., C =<weightq ). Then,
the action descriptions D ′ = (D ∪ I) \ {caused TvON if PowerON} and D ′′ = Du ∪ I satisfy Co and thus are pre-solutions.
However, D ′′ does not satisfy Cp , which implies weightq(D ′′) = 0, whereas weightq(D ′) = 1, and hence D ′′ C D ′ .
For further details on comparing action descriptions by means of weighted constraints and other semantic preferences,
we refer the reader to [18].
In the rest of the paper, we will study ADU problems at an abstract level, leaving the preference relation undeﬁned. For
some problems, we will provide more concrete results by instantiating the preference relation: we will take C as ⊂ (and
Cp = ∅, thus C = Co) for an instance of a syntax-based relation, and we consider C =<weightq as a representative of the
semantic-based approaches.
4. Properties of updates
In this section, we study some basic properties of solutions to an ADU problem. To this end, we ﬁrst introduce a
subsumption relation between action descriptions, and then show that solutions to an ADU problem fulﬁll some desired
properties regarding special updates, provided that the preference relation C obeys some natural conditions. We then con-
sider the structure of solutions and pre-solutions, and establish a disjoint factorization result that allows decomposing an
ADU into smaller parts.
4.1. Basic update properties
We deﬁne subsumption of causal laws by an action description as follows.
Deﬁnition 3 (Subsumption). Let D be an action description over a signature L = 〈F,A〉. Then,
• a static law (4) over L is subsumed by D , if for every state s in T (D), the interpretation of F describing s satisﬁes G ⊃ L;
• a dynamic law (5) over L is subsumed by D , if for every transition 〈s, A, s′〉 in T (D), the following holds: if the inter-
pretation of F∪ A describing s and A satisﬁes H , then the interpretation of F describing s′ satisﬁes G ⊃ L.
A set S of causal laws is subsumed by an action description D , if every law in S is subsumed by D .
Furthermore, we build on the properties of a preference relation C introduced next.
In the following, for an action description D and a set C of constraints, let us denote by CD the set {c ∈ C | D | c}.
Deﬁnition 4. Given a set of constraints C over a signature L = 〈F,A〉, a preference relation C over a L is called
• monotone with respect to C , if for any two action descriptions D and D ′ in L, CD ′ ⊆ CD implies D C D ′ , and strongly
monotone with respect to C , if additionally CD ′ ⊂ CD implies D ′ C D;
• monotone with respect to L, if for any two action descriptions D and D ′ in L, D ′ ⊆ D implies D C D ′ , and strongly
monotone with respect to L, if additionally D ′ ⊂ D implies D ′ C D;
• non-minimizing with respect to L, if for any action description D in L, D | C implies D C D ′ for all D ′ ⊆ D , and strongly
non-minimizing with respect to L, if additionally D | C implies D ′ C D for all D ′ ⊂ D .
We say that C is monotone, if it is either monotone with respect to C or monotone with respect to L (or both).
Monotonicity is an intuitive potential requirement one might have on a preference relation: monotonicity with respect
to C encodes the semantically motivated preference of satisfying preferable constraints as much as possible, whereas mono-
tonicity with respect to L expresses a more syntactic view of retaining as many causal laws as possible. This is reﬂected in
our representative preference relations. Notice that ⊂ is strongly monotone with respect to L (but not necessarily with re-
spect to C ), whereas <weightq is monotone with respect to C if, for instance, all weights are non-negative (but not necessarily
with respect to L).
Obviously, any monotone preference relation is also non-minimizing with respect to L, and strong monotonicity with
respect to L implies that C is also strongly non-minimizing with respect to L. Intuitively, a non-minimizing preference
relation with respect to L ensures that syntactically smaller (with respect to subset inclusion) action descriptions cannot
prevent an action description that satisﬁes all constraints from being a solution, while the respective strong property explic-
itly excludes syntactically smaller action descriptions as solutions in this case (note that the additional condition implies the
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an ADU problem as follows.
Proposition 1 (Subsumption). Let (D, I,C,C ) be an ADU problem, such thatC is non-minimizing with respect to L, D is consistent
and D | C. If D subsumes I , then D ∪ I is a solution to (D, I,C,C ). Moreover if C is strongly non-minimizing with respect to L,
then D ∪ I is the unique solution.
Proof. Let D = Du ∪ Dm and let T (D) = 〈S, V , R〉. Since D ∪ I = Du ∪ I ∪ Dm trivially satisﬁes (ii) of our deﬁnition of update
accomplishment, it remains to show: (i) D ∪ I is consistent, (iii) D ∪ I | Co , and (iv) for every D ′ , Du ∪ I ⊆ D ′ ⊆ D ∪ I and
D ′ | Co implies D ∪ I C D ′ .
Let T (D ∪ I) = 〈S ′, V ′, R ′〉. In the following we prove that T (D ∪ I) = T (D).
S ′ = S: Since D ⊆ D ∪ I , we get S ′ ⊆ S . Furthermore, D subsumes I and, hence, every s ∈ S satisﬁes G ⊃ L for all static
laws of form (4) in I , i.e., S ⊆ S ′ .
V ′ = V : Follows from S ′ = S and our labeling convention for states.
R ′ = R: Let 〈s, A, s′〉 be a candidate for a transition relation, R , of an action description, D , if (a) s′ satisﬁes the heads L
of all static laws of form (4) in D , for which s′ satisﬁes G , and (b) s′ satisﬁes the heads L of all dynamic laws of form (5)
in D , for which s′ satisﬁes G and s ∪ A satisﬁes H . Furthermore, let s′ be a determined successor of s w.r.t. A, if the set of
heads of all laws applicable to 〈s, A, s′〉 uniquely determines s′ , i.e., it contains (at least) one ﬂuent literal for every ﬂuent
in F. Then, 〈s, A, s′〉 ∈ R iff it is a candidate for R and s′ is a determined successor of s with respect to A. Since D ⊆ D ∪ I ,
every candidate 〈s, A, s′〉 for R ′ is a candidate for R . Moreover, that D subsumes I implies that every candidate 〈s, A, s′〉 for
R is a candidate for R ′ as well. As 〈s, A, s′〉 is neither in R nor in R ′ , if s′ is not a determined successor of s with respect to
A it follows that R ′ = R .
Given that D is consistent and that D | C , T (D ∪ I) = T (D) proves (i) and (iii). As for (iv), D | C and T ′ = T implies
D ∪ I | C . Since C is non-minimizing with respect to L, it follows for all Du ∪ I ⊆ D ′ ⊆ D ∪ I , that D ∪ I C D ′ , which
proves (iv). Therefore, D ∪ I is a solution to (D, I,C,C ). Moreover, if C is strongly non-minimizing with respect to L,
then D ′ C D ∪ I holds for all Du ∪ I ⊆ D ′ ⊆ D ∪ I . This implies that D ∪ I is the unique solution to (D, I,C,C ) in this
case. 
From this result, we obtain the following corollaries telling us that the solution to an ADU is as we would expect in
some extremal cases, that correspond to cases that were considered for non-monotonic logic programming updates [5,20].
Corollary 1 (Void update). Let (D,∅,C,C ) be an ADU problem. If C is non-minimizing with respect to L, D is consistent, and
D | C, then D is a solution to (D,∅,C, C ). If C is strongly non-minimizing with respect to L, then D is the unique solution.
Corollary 2 (Idempotence). Let (D, D,C,C ) be an ADU problem, such that C is non-minimizing with respect to L, D is consistent,
and D | C, then D is the unique solution to (D, D,C,C ).
Note that Void Update and Idempotence can easily be extended to cases where I ⊆ D: given that D is consistent and
D | C , it holds that D is a solution if C is non-minimizing; for strongly non-minimizing C , it is the unique solution.
Let us call a causal law tautological, if it is subsumed by every action description D . Informally, such a causal law has no
logical content, and updating with it should not lead to any change. In fact we have the following property.
Corollary 3 (Addition of tautologies). Let (D, I,C,C ) be an ADU problem, such that C is non-minimizing with respect to L, D
is consistent, and D | C. If I consists of tautological causal laws, then D ∪ I is a solution to (D, I,C,C ). If C is strongly non-
minimizing with respect to L, then D ∪ I is the unique solution.
Notice that a similar property fails for logic programming updates as in [5,20].
Example 3. Consider an action description D that has the following causal laws:
inertial LightON,¬LightON,
caused LightON after SwitchLight ∧ ¬LightON,
caused ¬LightON after SwitchLight ∧ LightON.
Since D is consistent and ⊂ is strongly non-minimizing, we can state for any set C of constraints, such that D | C : D is
the unique solution to (D,∅,C,⊂) (void update), as well as to (D, D,C,⊂) (idempotence), and to (D, D ′,C,⊂) for any
tautological action description D ′ (addition of tautologies).
Considering <weightq with non-negative weights for any constraint c ∈ C instead of ⊂ as a preference relation (which is
non-minimizing), we can still infer that D ′ is a solution, in general however, it need not be unique.
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In the literature, two kinds of changes have been identiﬁed with the incorporation of new information, viz. revision
(which adds more precise knowledge about the domain) and update (which is a change of the world per se) [66]. Despite
the nature of change, a distinction is made whether beliefs are represented by a theory, i.e., by a logically closed set of
sentences, or through a theory base (knowledge base), i.e., a ﬁnite representation of a theory [33]. Ideally, operators for the
different kinds of belief change are characterized by different sets of axioms or postulates like the AGM theory [2] for belief
revision and the KM theory [39] for belief base update.
Fitting our approach in this context, we ﬁrst observe that a common basic assumption of the different belief change
postulates is that beliefs are sentences from a given logical language which is closed under the standard Boolean connec-
tives; this is not the case for action languages. In order to evaluate our approach in the style of AGM, or KM respectively,
it is thus necessary to interpret and adapt respective postulates. We note, however, that additional assumptions of the AGM
theory regarding the underlying inference relation, that it satisﬁes super-classicality, modus ponens, the deduction theorem
etc. (cf. [57]), are inapplicable.
Since an action description constitutes a ﬁnite representation of a theory about an action domain, our update approach
has to be classiﬁed as operating on belief bases. Let us brieﬂy recall the KM postulates for belief base update10:
(U1) KB  φ implies φ.
(U2) If KB implies φ, then KB  φ ≡ KB.
(U3) If both KB and φ are satisﬁable, then KB  φ is satisﬁable.
(U4) If KB1 ≡ KB2 and φ1 ≡ φ2, then KB1  φ1 ≡ KB2  φ2.
(U5) (KB  φ1)∧ φ2 implies KB  (φ1 ∧ φ2).
(U6) If KB  φ1 implies φ2 and KB  φ2 implies φ1, then KB  φ1 ≡ KB  φ2.
(U7) If KB is complete, then (KB  φ1)∧ (KB  φ2) implies KB  (φ1 ∨ φ2).
(U8) (KB1 ∨ KB2)  φ ≡ (KB  φ1)∨ (KB  φ2).
Besides these postulates for update, Katsuno and Mendelzon have reformulated the AGM postulates for the case of belief
base revision in propositional logic:
(R1) KB  φ implies φ.
(R2) If KB∧ φ is satisﬁable, then KB  φ ≡ KB∧ φ.
(R3) If φ is satisﬁable, then KB  φ is satisﬁable.
(R4) If KB1 ≡ KB2 and φ1 ≡ φ2, then KBφ1 ≡ KB2  φ2.
(R5) (KB  φ1)∧ φ2 implies KB  (φ1 ∧ φ2).
(R6) If (KB  φ1)∧ φ2 is consistent, then KB  (φ1 ∧ φ2) implies (KB  φ1)∧ φ2.
4.2.1. Interpretation of postulates
As for an interpretation of these postulates in our setting, we may take the subsumption relation between an action
description and a set of causal laws for characterizing implication (and thus equivalence).
Lemma 1 (Equivalence). Let D1 and D2 be action descriptions over a signature L = 〈F,A〉. Suppose that for every causal law l over L,
it holds that D1 subsumes l iff D2 subsumes l. Then T (D1) = T (D2).
Proof. Let T (D1) = 〈S1, V1, R1〉 and T (D2) = 〈S2, V2, R2〉. Towards a contradiction ﬁrst suppose that S1 = S2. W.l.o.g., as-
sume that s is a state in S1 such that s /∈ S2. Consider an arbitrary ﬂuent F , and let F¯ denote ¬F if F is true in s, and F
otherwise. Then, D1 does not subsume l = caused F¯ if ∧s(G)=t G ∧∧s(G)= f ¬G , whereas D2 trivially subsumes l, a contra-
diction. Hence, S1 = S2 holds, and therefore also V1 = V2. Next, suppose R1 = R2, and w.l.o.g. assume that 〈s, A, s′〉 ∈ R1
and 〈s, A, s′〉 /∈ R2. Again consider an arbitrary ﬂuent F , and let F¯ denote ¬F if F is true in s′ , and F otherwise. Then, D1
does not subsume
l = caused F¯ if
∧
s′(G)=t
G ∧
∧
s′(G)= f
¬G after
∧
Ha∈A
Ha ∧
∧
Ha∈A\A
¬Ha ∧
∧
s(Hs)=t
Hs ∧
∧
s(Hs)= f
¬Hs,
whereas D2 trivially subsumes l, a contradiction. Therefore R1 = R2 holds as well. This proves the claim. 
Closing the language under conjunction is also no problem, since an action description can be regarded as the con-
junction of its causal laws. However, the meaning of negation (and disjunction) of causal laws and action descriptions is
ambiguous and undeﬁned. Therefore, we refrain from an interpretation of postulates (U7) and (U8).
10 Hansson’s [33] postulates for contraction would, in style of Levi Identity give rise to revision via contraction and expansion; however, this requires the
use of negation, which we lack here.
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acterized by syntactically and semantically different entities, namely causal laws and constraints. Naturally, KB implies φ
might be understood component-wise as KB subsumes the causal laws given by φ and KB satisﬁes the constraints given
by φ.
Given these considerations, we paraphrase the postulates as follows:
(R1), (U1) If D ′ is a solution to (D, I,C,C ), then D ′ subsumes I and D ′ | C .
(R2) If D ∪ I is consistent and D ∪ I | C , then T (D ′) = T (D) for any solution D ′ of (D, I,C,C ).
(U2) If D subsumes I and D | C , then T (D ′) = T (D) for any solution D ′ of (D, I,C,C ).
(R3) If there exists an action description D ′ such that D ′ is consistent, D ′ subsumes I and D ′ | C , then there exists a
solution to (D, I,C,C ).
(U3) If D is consistent, and there exists an action description D ′ such that D ′ is consistent, D ′ subsumes I , and D ′ | C ,
then (D, I,C,C ) has a solution.
(R4), (U4) If T (D1) = T (D2), T (I1) = T (I2), and C1 ≡ C2, then T (D ′1) = T (D ′2) for any solutions D ′1 and D ′2 of (D1, I1,C1,C ) and (D2, I2,C2,C ), respectively.
(R5), (U5) If D ′ is a solution to (D, I1,C1,C ) and D ′ ∪ I2 subsumes l, then D ′′ subsumes l for some solution D ′′ of
(D, I1 ∪ I2,C1 ∪ C2,C ).
(R6) If D ′ is a solution to (D, I1,C1,C ) and D ′ ∪ I2 is consistent and satisﬁes C2, then D ′′ subsumes l implies D ′ ∪ I2
subsumes l, for some solution D ′′ of (D, I1 ∪ I2,C1 ∪ C2,C ).
(U6) If D ′1 is a solution to (D, I1,C1,C ) such that D ′1 subsumes I2 and D ′1 | C2, and D ′2 is a solution to (D, I2,C2,C )
such that D ′2 subsumes I1 and D ′2 | C1, then T (D ′1) = T (D ′2).
Obviously, (R1) and (U1) hold by deﬁnition, whereas (R2) holds for strongly non-minimizing C . For (U2), we also
know from Proposition 1 that it holds if D is consistent, in addition to a strongly non-minimizing C . Both conditions are
necessary.
Concerning (R3) and (U3), they do not hold in general, unless Du ⊆ D ′ ⊆ D ∪ I . In case of the latter they hold by
deﬁnition; to wit the former, let D = Du = {caused F }, C =⊂, I = {caused ¬F }, and C = ∅. Note that the property holds
if C = ∅ and Du = ∅.
Proposition 2 (Solution existence). Let (D, I,C,C ) be an ADU problem, such that D ′ is consistent, D ′ | C, and D ′ subsumes I for
some action description D ′ with signature L. Then, there exists a solution to (D, I,C,C ) if (i) Du ⊆ D ′ ⊆ D ∪ I and D ′ ∪ I | C, or
(ii) C = ∅ and Du = ∅.
Proof. Note that consistency of D ′ and that D ′ subsumes I implies that I is consistent. In Case (i) this implies that D ′ ∪ I is
consistent. Furthermore, Du ⊆ D ′ ∪ I ⊆ D ∪ I and D ′ ∪ I | C hold. Hence, D ′ ∪ I is a pre-solution, which proves the existence
of a solution. For (ii), observe that Du = ∅ ⊆ I ⊆ D ∪ I , and that I | C (since C = ∅). Hence, I is a pre-solution, which proves
the existence of a solution. 
Irrelevance of Syntax (R4/U4) does not hold, even for C =⊂ and C = ∅: Consider D1 = {caused F , caused ¬F }, D2 =
{caused G, caused F if G, caused ¬F if G}, and I1 = I2 = ∅.
We remark, that the above counterexample is a canonical one, in the sense that I1 = I2 = ∅ and C = ∅, however with
inconsistent D1 and D2. Note, that is easily modiﬁed to a counterexample where D1 and D2 are consistent (and, for instance,
I1 and I2 are nonempty).
Property (R5), (U5) holds if just consistency is required (C = ∅), D ′ ∪ I2 is consistent, and C is strongly non-
minimizing. In general it fails as witnessed by: D = Dm = {caused F after A}, C =⊂, I1 = {caused ¬F after A ∧ ¬F },
I2 = {caused ¬F after A ∧ F }, and C = {SOMETIMES executable A}. In this case, D ′′ = I1 ∪ I2 is the only solution of
(D, I1 ∪ I2,C,C ) (since D ∪ I1 ∪ I2 does not satisfy C ). However, D ′′ does not subsume caused F after A, which is the
case for D ′ = D ∪ I1. The property also does not hold for strongly non-minimizing C in case of C = ∅ if D ′ ∪ I2 is incon-
sistent: Let D = Dm = {caused F }, C =⊂, I1 = {caused G}, I2 = {caused ¬F }. Then, D ′′ = I1 ∪ I2, which does not subsume
caused F .
Similarly, (R6) holds if just consistency is required (C = ∅), and C is strongly non-minimizing. In general it fails: Let
D = Dm = {caused F after A ∧ F }, C =⊂, I1 = ∅, I2 = {caused F after A ∧ ¬F }, C1 = {SOMETIMES ¬executable A}, and
C2 = ∅. Then, D ′′ = I2, which subsumes l = caused ¬F after A ∧ F . However, D ′ ∪ I2 = D ∪ I2 does not subsume l, although
it is consistent and trivially satisﬁes C2.
Proposition 3 (Unique consequence). Let (D, I1,∅,C ) and (D, I1 ∪ I2,∅,C ) be ADU problems, such that C is strongly non-
minimizing w.r.t. L. If D ′ is a solution to (D, I1,∅,C ) and D ′ ∪ I2 is consistent, then D ′ ∪ I2 is a solution to (D, I1 ∪ I2,∅,C ).
Proof. Obviously D ′ ∪ I2 is a pre-solution of (D, I1 ∪ I2,∅,C ), since it is consistent and trivially satisﬁes C = ∅. Towards
a contradiction assume that there is a consistent action description D ′′ such that (D ′ ∪ I2)C D ′′ and Du ∪ I1 ∪ I2 ⊆ D ′′ ⊆
T. Eiter et al. / Artiﬁcial Intelligence 174 (2010) 1172–1221 1187D∪ I1∪ I2. Then, since C is strongly non-minimizing w.r.t. L, we conclude that (D ′ ∪ I2) ⊂ D ′′ . Let D1 = D ′′ \ (I2 \D ′). Then,
D ′ ⊂ D1. Furthermore, D1 is consistent (because satisfaction of static laws is monotone) and trivially satisﬁes C , i.e., D1 is a
pre-solution to (D, I1,∅,C ). Because C is strongly non-minimizing w.r.t. L, it follows from D ′ ⊂ D1 that D ′ C D1. This
contradicts the assumption that D ′ is a solution to (D, I1,∅,C ). Therefore, D ′′ cannot exist, i.e., D ′ ∪ I2 is a solution to
(D, I1 ∪ I2,∅,C ). 
Eventually, (U6) fails to hold even for strongly non-minimizing C if just consistency is required C = ∅: Let D = ∅,C =⊂, I1 = {caused F after A ∧ F }, I2 = {caused F after A}, and C1 = C2 = ∅. Then I1 subsumes I2 and vice versa, but
T (I1) = T (I2).
4.2.2. Discussion
Summing up, we observe that even in the simple setting without unmodiﬁable laws (Du = ∅), without constraints (C =
∅), and with set inclusion as preference relation (C =⊂), not all postulates are satisﬁed. Concerning the revision postulates,
apart from an additional consistency requirement for solution existence in R5, the only postulate that completely fails is
Irrelevance of Syntax (R4/U4). This is intuitive, however, given that the causal information in an action description depends
on its syntactical representation in terms of causal laws. While different sets of causal laws, i.e., knowledge bases, may
represent the same transition diagram, when (the same) new information is incorporated, this no longer needs to be the
case.
Concerning the update postulates, in addition to the failure of (U4), postulate (U2) does not hold in general. The reason
is that solutions must be consistent, a property which has been discussed as one of the discriminating properties between
update and revision. In this respect, our approach certainly acts like a revision operator. Moreover, (U6) fails to hold even
in this simple setting.
Let us turn to more sophisticated ADU problems, where more than (static) consistency is required for solutions, and
dynamic requirements need to hold after changing the knowledge base. Recall that in general such requirements cannot be
expressed in terms of causal laws. (With the latter, one can represent action domains that satisfy the respective requirement,
which would amount to specify the solution as the new information to be incorporated, however, rather than expressing the
requirement itself.) As soon as dynamic requirements can be demanded (C = ∅), several postulates cease to hold: (R3), (U3),
(R5), (U5), and (R6). For (R3) and (U3), the reason is that the solution space is constrained to causal laws occurring in D ∪ I
(which we consider a reasonable assumption for practical change operations in our setting). In case of (R5), (U5), and (R6),
which are related to the supplementary AGM postulates (i.e., AGM postulates K∗7 and K∗8 [57]), the simple counterexamples
reveal that the main reason for this failure is due to the non-monotonicity of the action language and that it is rather
independent of the problem deﬁnition.
4.3. Disjoint factorization
We next consider a structural property of solutions and pre-solutions, which can be exploited for a syntactical decompo-
sition of an ADU problem, in a divide-and-conquer manner. Because of the involved semantics of transitions and causation,
in general some prerequisites are needed.
Deﬁnition 5 (NOP). We say that an action description D has NOP, if T (D) has either (i) a transition 〈s,∅, s〉 for some state s,
or (ii) for every state s, there exists a transition 〈s,∅, s′〉.
Notice that NOP is a very natural property that often applies, in particular for time-driven domains, where passage of
time causes 〈s,∅, s〉 by inertia, usually for all states s.
The following lemma is the key for our disjoint factorization result. For any action signature L = 〈F,A〉, we denote by
LD the part of it which appears in any action description D .
Lemma 2. Let T (Di) = 〈Si, V i, Ri〉 for action descriptions Di , i = 0,1, such that LD0 ∩ LD1 = ∅. Let T (D0 ∪ D1) = 〈S, V , R〉. Then
the following hold:
(i) S = {s0 ∪ s1 | s0 ∈ S0, s1 ∈ S1};
(ii) if R0 = ∅ and R1 = ∅ then, for 〈s00, A0, s01〉 ∈ R0 and 〈s10, A1, s11〉 ∈ R1 , 〈s00 ∪ s10, A0 ∪ A1, s01 ∪ s11〉 ∈ R;
(iii) for 〈s, A, s′〉 ∈ R, 〈s ∩ LD0 , A ∩ LD0 , s′ ∩ LD0 〉 ∈ R0 and 〈s ∩ LD1 , A ∩ LD1 , s′ ∩ LD1 〉 ∈ R1 .
Proof. (i) is trivial. We prove (ii) and (iii) as follows.
(ii) Suppose that R0 = ∅ and R1 = ∅. Take any 〈s00, A0, s01〉 ∈ R0 and 〈s10, A1, s11〉 ∈ R1. We show that 〈s00 ∪ s10, A0 ∪ A1,
s01 ∪ s11〉 ∈ R . Suppose this is not the case. Then one of the following two cases holds:
(1) For some dynamic law d of the form (5) in D0 ∪ D1, s00 ∪ s10 ∪ A0 ∪ A1 satisﬁes H , and s01 ∪ s11 does not satisfy G ∧ L.
W.l.o.g., suppose that d is in D0. Then, since LD0 ∩ LD1 = ∅, s00 ∪ A0 satisﬁes H and s01 does not satisfy G ∧ L. This implies
that 〈s0, A0, s0〉 /∈ R0, which is a contradiction.0 1
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satisﬁes G , and of every dynamic law (5) in D0 ∪ D1, such that satisfaction of H by s00 ∪ s10 ∪ A0 ∪ A1 implies that s01 ∪ s11
satisﬁes G . Then (since each causal law is in D0 or D1 but not in both, due to LD0 ∩ LD1 = ∅), it follows that, s02 satisﬁes
the heads of all static laws (4) in D0 for which s00 satisﬁes G , and of every dynamic law (5) in D
0, such that satisfaction of
H by s00 ∪ A0 implies that s01 satisﬁes G . This implies that 〈s00, A0, s01〉 /∈ R1. (Symmetrically, the claim holds for D1.) This is
again a contradiction.
(iii) Take any 〈s, A, s′〉 ∈ R . W.l.o.g., suppose that 〈s ∩ LD0 , A ∩ LD0 , s′ ∩ LD0〉 /∈ R0. Then one of the following two cases
holds:
(1) For some dynamic law d of the form (5) in D0, s ∩ LD0 ∪ A ∩ LD0 satisﬁes H , and s′ ∩ LD0 does not satisfy G ∧ L.
Since LD0 ∩ LD1 = ∅, s ∪ A satisﬁes H and s′ does not satisfy G ∧ L. This implies 〈s, A, s′〉 /∈ R , a contradiction.
(2) s02 is another state that satisﬁes the heads of all static laws in D
0 for which s∩LD0 satisﬁes G , and of every dynamic
law (5) in D1 such that satisfaction of H by s ∩ LD0 ∪ A ∩ LD0 implies that s′ ∩ LD0 satisﬁes G . Consider s′′ = s02 ∪ s′ ∩ LD1 .
Due to (i) above, s′′ ∈ S . Moreover, since LD0 ∩ LD1 = ∅, the following holds: s′′ satisﬁes the heads of all static laws (4) in
D0 ∪ D1 for which s satisﬁes G , and of every dynamic law (5) in D0 ∪ D1, such that satisfaction of H by s ∪ A implies that
s′ satisﬁes G . This implies that 〈s, A, s′〉 /∈ R , which is a contradiction. 
Intuitively, this lemma describes how the transition diagram of an action description can be composed, if the action
description consists of two syntactically disjoint parts. It can thus be exploited to decompose a given action description into
disjoint parts as in our next result. For such a decomposition to be faithful in the sense that solutions to the respective ADU
subproblems can be composed to yield a solution to the original ADU problem, care has to be taken with respect to two
aspects: First, an empty set of transitions shall not compromise the approach, and thus has to be avoided, in the presence
of dynamic constraints (cf. Lemma 2(ii)). This can be guaranteed by the NOP property, which will in fact be suﬃcient
for composing pre-solutions. Second, for composing solutions the composed preference relation needs to comply with the
preferences of the subproblems. Stated from the viewpoint of decomposition, the preference relation must be factorizable.
Towards a formal treatment of these ideas, we need further terminology. We call (L0,L1), where Li = 〈Fi,Ai〉, i = 0,1,
a partitioning of a signature L = 〈F,A〉, if (F0,F1) and (A0,A1) are partitioning of F and A, respectively. We ﬁrst deﬁne
decompositions of action descriptions and constraints.
Deﬁnition 6 (AD/constraint decomposition). Suppose (L0,L1) is a partitioning of a signature L = 〈F,A〉, and let X be either
an action description or a set of constraints over L. Then a partitioning (X0, X1) of X is called a decomposition of X with
respect to (L0,L1), if LXi ⊆ Li , for i = 0,1. Furthermore, X is decomposable with respect to (L0,L1), if such a decomposition
exists.
Based on this, we next deﬁne the notion of a near-decomposition of an ADU problem, which splits the action description
and the constraints in separate parts while disregarding preference.
Deﬁnition 7 (Near-decomposition). Let (D, I,C,C ) be an ADU problem with signature L, and let (D0, D1), (I0, I1), and
(C0,C1) be decompositions of D , I , and C , respectively, with respect to a partitioning (L0,L1) of L. Then, ((D0, I0,C0),
(D1, I1,C1)) is a near-decomposition of (D, I,C,C ) with respect to (L0,L1).
The following theorem now formally shows that the pre-solutions of an ADU problem can be obtained from those of
a near-decomposition, provided that some ramifying conditions hold. We say that a constraint c occurs positively (resp.
negatively) in a set C of constraints, if c occurs in the scope of an even (resp. odd) number of negations in a constraint in C .
Theorem 1 (Disjointness). Given an ADU problem (D, I,C,C ) with signature L, let ((D0, I0,C0), (D1, I1,C1)) be a near-
decomposition with respect to a partitioning (L0,L1) of L, and let Ci be an arbitrary preference ordering for action descriptions
over Li , i = 0,1. Then the following holds:
(i) Let Xi be a pre-solution to (Di, I i,Ci,Ci ) such that Xi has NOP if some dynamic constraint occurs negatively in C1−i , for i = 0,1.
Then X0 ∪ X1 is a pre-solution to (D, I,C,C ).
(ii) Let X be a pre-solution to (D, I,C,C ), and let (X0, X1) be any partitioning of X with respect to (L0,L1) such that Xi ⊆ Di and
Xi has NOP if some dynamic constraint occurs positively in C1−i , for i = 0,1. Then, Xi is a pre-solution to (Di, I i,Ci,Ci ), for
i = 0,1.
Proof. Let T (X0 ∪ X1) = 〈S, V , R〉 and let T (Xi) = 〈Si, V i, Ri〉. We ﬁrst show for any static constraint c, that X0 ∪ X1, s | c
if c ∈ Ci , Xi, si | c, and s ∩ Li = si . Since for each ﬂuent literal L in c, si | L implies s | L, and since c ∈ LCi ⊆ Li (i.e.,
c contains only ﬂuent literals from Li), the claim follows. Conversely, for any static constraint c, it holds that Xi, si | c if
c ∈ Ci , X0 ∪ X1, s | c, and si = s ∩ Li . Again due to the fact that every ﬂuent literal L in c is from Li , we conclude that
s | L implies si | L, which proves the claim. Therefore, we conclude for any static constraint c ∈ LCi ⊆ Li that there exists
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Lemma 2(i)), X0 ∪ X1, s | c for all s ∈ S iff Xi, si | c for all si ∈ Si . Hence, if C just contains static constraints, then X0 ∪ X1
satisﬁes C iff X0 satisﬁes C0 and X1 satisﬁes C1.
We next consider dynamic constraints c of the form necessarily Q after A1; . . . ; An or ¬necessarily Q after A1; . . . ; An
and show the following: (1) X0 ∪ X1, s | c if c ∈ Ci , Xi, si | c, s∩ Li = si , and X1−i has NOP if c is negative, or Q contains
a negative dynamic constraint; (2) Xi, si | c if c ∈ Ci , X0 ∪ X1, s | c, si = s ∩ Li , and X1−i has NOP if c is positive, or Q
contains a positive dynamic constraint. We proceed by induction on the nesting depth k of the constraint.
Base case (k = 0): (1) Let c be positive and towards a contradiction consider a state s ∈ S , such that s ∩ Li = si and
there exists a history h = s, A1, s1, . . . , sn−1, An, sn , such that sn | Q . By Lemma 2(iii), every transition of the history hi =
si, A1, s1 ∩ Li, . . . , sn−1 ∩ Li, An, sn ∩ Li is in Ri . Furthermore, sn | Q implies sn ∩ Li | Q because c ∈ Xi and Q contains
only static constraints. Contradiction. If c is negative, then there exists a history hi = si, A1, si1, . . . , sin−1, An, sin such that
sin | Q . Since X1−i has NOP, there exists a sequence of n + 1 states, such that h1−i = s1−i,∅, s1−i1 , . . . , s1−in−1,∅, s1−in is a
history of X1−i . By Lemma 2(ii), h = si ∪ s1−i, A1, . . . , An, sin ∪ s1−in is a history of X0 ∪ X1. Furthermore, sin | Q implies
sin ∪ s1−in | Q because c ∈ Xi and Q contains only static constraints. Contradiction. This proves (1) for k = 0.
(2) Let c be positive and towards a contradiction consider a state si ∈ Si , such that si = s ∩ Li and there exists a history
h = si, A1, si1, . . . , sin−1, An, sin , such that sin | Q . Since X1−i has NOP, there exists a sequence of n + 1 states, such that
h1−i = s1−i,∅, s1−i1 , . . . , s1−in−1,∅, s1−in is a history of X1−i . By Lemma 2(ii), h = si ∪ s1−i, A1, . . . , An, sin ∪ s1−in is a history of
X0 ∪ X1. Furthermore, sin | Q implies sin ∪ s1−in | Q because c ∈ Xi and Q contains only static constraints. Contradiction. If
c is negative, then there exists a history h = s, A1, s1, . . . , sn−1, An, sn , such that sn | Q . By Lemma 2(iii), every transition of
the history hi = si, A1, s1 ∩ Li, . . . , sn−1 ∩ Li, An, sn ∩ Li is in Ri . Furthermore, sn | Q implies sn ∩ Li | Q because c ∈ Xi
and Q contains only static constraints. Contradiction. This proves (2) for k = 0.
Induction step: Let (1) and (2) be true for dynamic constraints of nesting depth at most k − 1 and consider a dynamic
constraint c of nesting depth k. Then, Q contains only static constraints and dynamic constraints of nesting depth at most
k−1. Thus, (1) and (2) also hold for c, as follows easily by the arguments of the base case, replacing justiﬁcations by the fact
that Q contains only static constraints with a respective justiﬁcation that Q contains only static constraints and dynamic
constraints of nesting depth at most k − 1.
So far, we have shown that (1) and (2) hold for any open constraint. By the structure of S (cf. Lemma 2(i)), we conclude
for any existential or universal constraint c that X0 ∪ X1 | c if c ∈ Ci , Xi | c, and X1−i has NOP if c contains a negative
dynamic constraint, as well as that Xi | c if c ∈ Ci , X0 ∪ X1 | c, and X1−i has NOP if c contains a positive dynamic
constraint. Therefore, Xi | Ci and X1−i has NOP if Ci contains a negative dynamic constraint, for i ∈ {0,1}, implies X0 ∪
X1 | C . Conversely, X0 ∪ X1 | C and X1−i has NOP if Ci contains a positive dynamic constraint implies Xi | Ci , for
i ∈ {0,1}.
We now proceed with the proof of the theorem. Case (i): Let Xi be a pre-solution to (Di, I i,Ci,Ci ), for i = 0,1. Suppose
that, for i = 0,1, Xi has NOP if some dynamic constraint occurs negatively in C1−i . We show that X0 ∪ X1 is a pre-solution
to (D, I,C,C ). By Lemma 2(i), X0 ∪ X1 is consistent, since X0 and X1 are consistent. Furthermore, D0u ∪ D1u ∪ I0 ∪ I1 ⊆
X0 ∪ X1 ⊆ D ∪ I follows from D0u ∪ I0 ⊆ X0 ⊆ D0 ∪ I0 and D1u ∪ I1 ⊆ X1 ⊆ D1 ∪ I1, respectively. Eventually, X0 | C0 and
X1 | C1 implies X0 ∪ X1 | C . This proves that X0 ∪ X1 is a pre-solution to (D, I,C,C ).
Case (ii): Let X be a pre-solution to (D, I,C,C ), and let (X0, X1) be a partitioning of X such that X0 ⊆ D0 and X1 ⊆ D1.
Suppose that, for i = 0,1, Xi has NOP if some dynamic constraint occurs positively in C1−i . We prove that for i = 0,1, Xi
is a pre-solution to (Di, I i,Ci,Ci ). Since X is consistent, also X0 and X1 are consistent. To see this, observe that w.l.o.g.,
if X0 is inconsistent, then the static laws in X0 are unsatisﬁable, which implies X is unsatisﬁable as well, a contradiction.
Moreover, Du ∪ I ⊆ X ⊆ D ∪ I implies D0u ∪ I0 ⊆ X0 ⊆ D0 ∪ I0 and D1u ∪ I1 ⊆ X1 ⊆ D1 ∪ I1. Finally, X0 ∪ X1 | C implies
X0 | C0 and X1 | C1. Thus, X0 and X1 are near solutions to (D0, I0,C0,C0 ) and (D1, I1,C1,C1 ), respectively. 
Informally, the NOP property in Theorem 1 is needed to ensure that the transition diagrams of pre-solutions to the sub-
problems can be “combined.” As already mentioned above, this is only necessary in the presence of dynamic constraints.
For a full decomposition of an ADU problem, we need beyond a near decomposition also a factorization of the preference
relation, which is formally deﬁned as follows.
Deﬁnition 8 (Preference factorization). Let C be a preference relation for action descriptions over signature L, and let
(L0,L1) be a partitioning of L. A pair (C0 ,C1 ) of preference relations Ci for action descriptions over Li , i = 0,1, is a
factorization of C with respect to (L0,L1), if for any action descriptions D, D ′ over L that are decomposable with respect to
(L0,L1), it holds that D C D ′ implies that either D0 C0 D ′0 ∧ D ′1 C1 D1 or D ′0 C0 D0 ∧ D1 C1 D ′1.
Note that preference by strict subset inclusion (C =⊂) is always factorizable (e.g., taking ⊂ as the preference relations
of the factorization). We also remark that if the set of constraints C is decomposable with respect to (L0,L1), then the
constraint weight preference <weightq is factorizable, provided that weights are non-negative (for instance, taking the same
weights for the factorization).
A full decomposition of an ADU problem is then as follows.
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(L0,L1) of its signature L is a pair ((D0, I0,C0,C0 ), (D1, I1,C1,C1 )) such that ((D0, I0,C0), (D1, I1,C1)) is a near-
decomposition of (D, I,C,C ) and (C0 ,C1 ) is a factorization of C .
The following result, which is the main result of this section regarding solutions of an ADU problem, is then easily
obtained from Theorem 1.
Theorem 2. Let ((D0, I0,C0,C0 ), (D1, I1,C1,C1 )) be a decomposition of an ADU problem (D, I,C,C ) with respect to a parti-
tioning (L0,L1) of its signature L. Suppose that either (i) no dynamic constraint occurs in C , or (ii) no dynamic constraint occurs
in C1 . If X i is a solution to (Di, I i,Ci,Ci ) for i = 0,1, where in case (ii) X1 has NOP, then X0 ∪ X1 is a solution to (D, I,C,C ).
Furthermore, in case (i) every solution to (D, I,C,C ) can be represented in this form.
Item (i) states that we can fully decompose an ADU into two components, and that all solutions can be obtained by
a simple combination of the solutions of the individual components. However, this works in general only in absence of
dynamic constraints (combining the transition graphs of the components is then unproblematic). Item (ii) accounts for
possible dynamic constraints in one component, which are unproblematic as long as solutions of the other have NOP.
However, not all solutions can be composed from solutions of the components in general.
Example 4. Consider the ADU problem (D ∪ D ′, I,C,⊂), with D , I , and C as in Example 1, and D ′ as in Example 3.
Since X0 = D ∪ I \ {caused TvON if PowerON} is a solution to (D, I,C,⊂) (cf. Example 1), X1 = D ′ is (the unique) solution
to (D ′,∅,∅,⊂) (cf. Example 3), and D ′ has NOP (which is easily veriﬁed), by Theorem 2(ii) X0 ∪ X1 = (D ∪ D ′ ∪ I) \
{caused TvON if PowerON} is a solution to (D ∪ D ′, I,C,⊂).
Example 5. Consider the ADU problem (D ∪ D ′, I,C,<weightq ), with D , I , C , and weightq as in Example 2, and D ′ as in
Example 3. Again X0 ∪ X1 = (D ∪ D ′ ∪ I) \ {caused TvON if PowerON} is a solution to (D ∪ D ′, I,C,<weightq ), as X0 = D ∪
I \ {caused TvON if PowerON} is a solution to (D, I,C,<weightq ) (cf. Example 2), and as X1 = D ′ is (the unique) solution to
(D ′,∅,∅,<weightq ). By Theorem 1, Du ∪ D ′ ∪ I is a different pre-solution to this ADU problem since Du ∪ I is a pre-solution
to (D, I,C,<weightq ). Moreover, setting the weight of constraint (13)
ALWAYS holds PowerON ∧ TvON ⊃
¬necessarily (holds TvON) after {PushPBTV}
to 0 (which amounts to assigning the preferred constraints a ‘don’t care’ status), it would be another solution.
Theorem 1 provides a basis for decomposing an ADU into smaller ADUs that can be solved in a divide-and-conquer
manner,11 and Theorem 2 shows some possible exploitation. These results can be integrated into algorithms for computing
solutions, which we consider in Section 6 below; their effectiveness is demonstrated on a practical example in Section 7.2.
Finally, note that for our exemplary preference relations ⊂ and <weightq with non-negative weights, the benign properties of
monotonicity and non-minimization with respect to L, carry over to their standard factorizations (given by restricting the
relation to the relevant domain) and can be recursively exploited.
5. Complexity analysis
In this section, we investigate the computational complexity of relevant tasks for solving an ADU problem, including
to decide whether a solution exists and whether a given action description is a solution. The complexity of these tasks
strongly depends on the complexity of deciding whether a given action description satisﬁes a set of (obligatory) constraints
(i.e., D | Co), and whether an action description is preferred over another action description under the given preference
relation (i.e., D C D ′).
We ﬁrst consider the worst-case complexity of the above mentioned subproblems as a parameter and derive upper
bounds (in terms of membership results) for deciding whether an ADU problem has a solution, and for checking whether
an action description is a solution to an ADU problem in a generic setting. We then ‘instantiate’ this generic setting by
considering different classes (restricted sets) of constraints which yield different complexities for deciding D | Co , and by
studying concrete preference relations for which the complexity of deciding D C D ′ differs. In particular, we provide com-
pleteness results for the syntactic preference ⊂ (for which deciding D C D ′ is polynomial) and for the semantic preference
<weightq (for which deciding D C D ′ ranges up to PSPACE) for the various classes of constraints considered. Note that
the class of admitted constraints is the main source of complexity in most concrete settings, in particular when deciding
D C D ′ reduces to deciding constraint fulﬁllment.
11 For similar and stronger results in classical propositional logic see [54].
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Complexity of deciding solution existence and solution checking, depending on the complexity of the relevant sub-
problems (completeness results; hardness holds for ﬁxed preference relation C ).
D | Co & D C D ′ Solution existence Solution checking
in PSPACE PSPACE PSPACE
in Pi (i > 1) Σ
P
i Π
P
i
in P NP DP
5.1. Generic upper bounds
Our main result on generic upper bounds, which however also gives the general picture of more precise complexity
characterizations, is summarized in Table 1. Recall that PSPACE is the class of decision problems that can be decided by a
(deterministic) Turing machine using space at most polynomial in the length of the input. PSPACE contains the so-called
polynomial hierarchy, a sequence of classes deﬁned as P0 = Σ P0 = Π P0 = P, and for i  0, by Pi+1 = PΣ
P
i , Σ Pi+1 = NPΣ
P
i , and
Π Pi+1 = coNPΣ
P
i . Finally, DP is the class of decision problems whose yes instances are characterized by the “conjunction” of
an NP problem and an independent coNP problem. The prototypical such problem is SAT-UNSAT, whose yes instances are
pairs (F ,G) of propositional formulas such that F is satisﬁable and G is unsatisﬁable; this problem is also complete for DP .
For a background in complexity theory, we refer to [53].
Informally, the results show that modulo the cost of deciding the satisfaction of constraints and preference, the com-
plexity of solution existence and checking increases at most by one level in the polynomial hierarchy, which is due to
the exponential search space for a solution respectively a better solution candidate, which might be non-deterministically
guessed. Since the search space can be traversed in polynomial space, there is no increase in complexity in the most general
case.
We next formally establish Table 1. Given an ADU problem (D, I,C,C ), let Ccheck denote the class of problems of
deciding D ′ | Co for any Du ∪ I ⊆ D ′ ⊆ D ∪ I . Similarly, let Pcheck denote the class of problems of deciding whether
D1 C D2 holds, for action descriptions Du ∪ I ⊆ Di ⊆ D ∪ I and i ∈ {1,2}.
Theorem 3. Deciding whether a given ADU problem (D, I,C,C ) has a solution (or a pre-solution) is
(i) in PSPACE if Ccheck is in PSPACE,
(ii) in Σ Pi if Ccheck is in 
P
i and i > 1,
(iii) in NP if Ccheck is in P.
Given an ADU problem (D, I,C,C ) together with an action description D ′ , deciding whether D ′ is a solution for it is
(a) in PSPACE if Ccheck and Pcheck are in PSPACE,
(b) in Π Pi if Ccheck and Pcheck are in 
P
i and i > 1,
(c) in DP if Ccheck and Pcheck are in P.
Proof. Let D = Du ∪ Dm . In order to decide whether (D, I,C,C ) has a solution, we can guess a pre-solution D ′ such that
Du ∪ I ⊆ D ′ ⊆ Du ∪ I , along with a state s for D ′ (to witness consistency), and check D ′ | Co in polynomial space (i),
otherwise in polynomial time (iii), respectively with the help of a Σ Pi−1-oracle. This proves (i), (ii), and (iii).
As for deciding whether a given D ′ is a solution, let us consider the complementary problem. We can non-
deterministically guess D ′′ together with a state s′′ and proceed as follows. We check in polynomial time whether
Du ∪ I ⊆ D ′ , or D ′ ⊆ D ∪ I . We also check whether D ′ is inconsistent (a) in polynomial space, respectively (b) with a
single call to an NP-oracle. Deciding whether D ′ | Co can be done in polynomial space in Case (a), and in polynomial
time with a Σ Pi−1-oracle in Case (b). Furthermore, we check in polynomial time whether Du ∪ I ⊂ D ′′ ⊆ D ∪ I and if D ′′ is
consistent (whether s′′ is state of D ′′). Two further checks decide whether D ′′ | Co and D ′ C D ′′ (a) in PSPACE, and (b) in
polynomial time with the help of a Σ Pi−1-oracle. Thus, the complementary problem is (a) in PSPACE, respectively (b) in Σ
P
i ,
proving (a) and (b).
For (c) we non-deterministically guess a state s′ of D ′ which we use to check consistency in polynomial time. Also we
decide Du ∪ I ⊆ D ′ ⊆ Du ∪ I in polynomial time. An independent coNP-check excludes more preferred pre-solutions, i.e., the
complementary problem of guessing D ′′ together with a state s′′ and checking Du ∪ I ⊂ D ′′ ⊆ D ∪ I , consistency (whether
s′′ is state of D ′′), D ′′ | Co , and D ′ C D ′′ in polynomial time. This proves DP -membership for (c). 
Before we turn our attention to ‘instantiating’ this general result for ADU problems with different classes (restricted
sets) of constraints and concrete preference relations, which will yield precise complexity characterizations in terms of
completeness results, we remark that to ease exposition, in the remainder of this section proofs are sketched, summarizing
the main arguments and constructions, while full proofs are given in Appendix A.
1192 T. Eiter et al. / Artiﬁcial Intelligence 174 (2010) 1172–12215.2. Constraint fulﬁllment
As outlined in the beginning of this section, one of the two important subtasks in solving ADU problems is checking
whether a set of constraints is satisﬁed by an action description. This subtask has a major inﬂuence on the complexity
of ﬁnding solutions of an ADU problem. Therefore, besides considering arbitrary constraints, we also investigate restricted
classes of constraints. In particular, when the maximal nesting depth of dynamic constraints is ﬁxed by an integer k, and
when no dynamic constraints occur at all.
Theorem 4. Given an action description D and a set C of constraints, deciding D | C is
(i) PSPACE-complete in general,
(ii) Θ Pk+3-complete if k is the maximal nesting depth of dynamic constraints in C , and
(iii) PNP‖ -complete if C does not involve dynamic constraints.
Here PNP‖ means polynomial-time with a single parallel evaluation of calls to an NP oracle. Similarly for i > 1, Θ Pi is the
class of problems that can be decided in polynomial time with parallel calls to a Σ Pi−1 oracle (alternatively, this class is
often characterized by allowing O (logn) many oracle calls) [65].
Proof. Concerning (i) the result has been shown in [18]. Membership in Case (iii) follows from the fact that checking the
truth of a negated universal constraint of the form ¬ALWAYS Q , where Q is a conjunction of clauses over static constraints
of the form holds F or ¬holds F , is in NP. Hence, the complementary task, i.e., checking the truth of a positive universal
constraint, ALWAYS Q , is in coNP. Thus, D | c is decided in polynomial time with a single parallel evaluation of n NP-oracle
calls, given that n is the number of universal constraints in c. Similarly, one proves in Case (ii) by induction on the nesting
depth k, that D | c is decided in polynomial time with parallel Σ Pk+2-oracle calls.
As for hardness, the problem in (iii) is reduced to the following PNP‖ -hard decision version of Maximum CNF Satisﬁabil-
ity [40]: Given a Boolean formula F in conjunctive normal form (CNF) and an integer k, decide whether the maximum number
of clauses in F that can be simultaneously satisﬁed by an interpretation is 0 mod k. Consider a 3-CNF formula of the form∧n
i=1 Li,1 ∨ Li,2 ∨ Li,3, where Li, j , 1  i  n, 1  j  3, is a literal over atoms X = {X1, . . . , Xm}, and the following action
description D1:
caused Ci if Li,1, caused Ci if Li,2, caused Ci if Li,3,
caused ¬Ci if ¬Li,1 ∧ ¬Li,2 ∧ ¬Li,3,
}
1 i  n
caused F1,1 if C1, caused ¬F1,1 if ¬C1,
caused F1,0 if ¬C1, caused ¬F1,0 if C1,
caused Fi, j if Ci ∧ Fi−1, j−1,
caused ¬Fi, j if ¬Ci ∧ Fi−1, j−1,
}
2 i  n, 1 j  i
caused Fi, j if ¬Ci ∧ Fi−1, j,
caused ¬Fi, j if Ci ∧ Fi−1, j,
}
2 i  n, 0 j < i.
Then D1 | ck iff the maximum number of clauses in F that can be simultaneously satisﬁed by an interpretation is 0 mod k,
where ck is the following constraint:
ALWAYS holds Fn,0 ∨
SOMETIMES holds Fn,k ∧ ALWAYS (¬holds Fn,k+1 ∧ · · · ∧ ¬holds Fn,n)∨
. . .
SOMETIMES holds Fn,lk ∧ ALWAYS (¬holds Fn,lk+1 ∧ · · · ∧ ¬holds Fn,n).
For hardness in Case (ii), consider m Quantiﬁed Boolean Formulas (QBFs) Φl = Q 1Xl1 Q 2 Xl2 · · · Qn Xln El , 1  l m, where
Q i = ∃ if i ≡ 1 mod 2 and Q i = ∀ otherwise, Xki and Xlj , 1  i, j  n and 1  k, l  m, are pairwise disjunct sets of
propositional variables if i = j or k = l and El is Boolean formula over atoms in Xl = Xl1 ∪ · · · ∪ Xln , such that if Φl is false
then Φl+1, . . . ,Φm are false, too. Deciding whether the maximum index o, 1 o m, such that Φo is true, is odd is Θ Pn+1-
hard [65]. The problem of deciding D | c for a constraint c with nesting depth k of dynamic constraints is reduced to this
problem, as follows.
Let n = k+ 2, 1 lm, and let the action description D2 consist of the following statements:
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i after Ai−1,
caused ¬F li if ¬F li after Ai−1,
}
2 i  n, F li ∈ Xli
caused F lj after Ai−1 ∧ F lj,
caused ¬F lj after Ai−1 ∧ ¬F lj,
}
2 i  n, 1 j  n, i = j, F lj ∈ Xlj.
Consider the constraint:
co =
{∨(m−3)/2
l=0 (SOMETIMES f
2l+1 ∧ ALWAYS ¬ f 2l+2)∨ gm ifm is odd,∨(m−2)/2
l=0 (SOMETIMES f
2l+1 ∧ ALWAYS ¬ f 2l+2) otherwise,
where
gm = SOMETIMES f m, and
f l = p1 N p1
(
. . . (pn−1 N pn−1 holds Elafter {An−1}) . . .
)
after {A1},
where N = necessarily, and where pi = ¬ if i is even and pi is void otherwise, for 1 i  n− 1. Then, the maximum index
o such that Φo is true, is odd iff D2 | co . 
5.3. Solution existence
Equipped with these precise complexity characterizations of Ccheck for ADU problems of some classes of constraints,
we aim to characterize exactly the complexity of the solution ﬁnding tasks for these classes of constraints and particular
preference relations. Notice that checking whether a solution exists is independent of the concrete preference relation and
its computation. This leads to the following result.
Theorem 5. Deciding whether a given ADU problem (D, I,C,C ) has a solution (or a pre-solution) is
(i) PSPACE-complete in general,
(ii) Σ Pk+3-complete, if k is the maximal nesting depth of dynamic constraints in Co,
(iii) Σ P2 -complete, if Co does not involve dynamic constraints, and
(iv) NP-complete if Co = ∅.
Proof. Membership follows from Theorems 3 and 4, and hardness in Case (i) follows from Theorem 4. For hardness in
Case (ii), let n = k + 2 and let Φ = ∃Y Q 1X1 · · · Qn Xn E be a QBF, where Q i = ∃ if i ≡ 0 mod 2 and Q i = ∀ otherwise.
Consider
Du = D2 ∪ {caused Yi after Ai−1 ∧ Yi, caused ¬Yi after Ai−1 ∧ ¬Yi | 2 i  n},
where D2 is the action description from the proof of Theorem 4 with l = 1, Dm = {caused Yi, caused ¬Yi | Yi ∈ Y }, I = ∅,
C = Co ∪ Cp with Cp = ∅, and Co = {co}, where
co = ALWAYS p1 N p1
(
. . .
(
pn−1 N pn−1 holds E after {An−1}
)
. . .
)
after {A1},
and where N = necessarily, and pi = ¬ if i is odd and void otherwise, for 1 i  n− 1. Then, there exists a solution to the
action description update problem (Du ∪ Dm, I,C,C ) iff Φ is true.
For (iii) let Φ = ∃Y ∀X E and consider the action description update problem (Du ∪ Dm, I,C,C ), where Du = ∅, Dm =
{caused Yi, caused ¬Yi | Yi ∈ Y }, I = ∅, and C = Co = {ALWAYS holds E}. Again, the action description update problem
(Du ∪ Dm, I,C,C ) has a solution iff Φ is true.
Finally, for (iv), let E be a Boolean formula over atoms Y and let us deﬁne Du = {caused Y1 if ¬E, caused ¬Y1 if ¬E},
Dm = {caused Yi, caused ¬Yi | Yi ∈ Y }, I = ∅, and C = ∅. Then, (Du ∪ Dm, I,C,C ) has a solution iff E is satisﬁable. 
This result can be instantiated with any preference relation and yields completeness results for deciding the existence
of a solution. When instantiated with our syntactic preference ⊂, a remarkable consequence is the following. Deciding
whether D ∪ I is a solution to an ADU problem (D, I,C,⊂) has the same complexity as deciding D | Co in general.
Deciding the existence of an arbitrary solution is slightly harder than deciding D | Co for restricted settings of constraints
in Co . Intuitively, the additional computational effort accounts for the search of a solution candidate.
5.4. Solution checking
We ﬁnally turn our attention to the recognition of solutions, where we provide respective results for the syntactic
preference ⊂ and the semantic preference <weightq . Again the problem turns out to be PSPACE-complete in general. Similarly
as before, for ⊂ in restricted constraint settings testing arbitrary solution candidates has higher complexity than testing
D ∪ I , which intuitively accounts for the additional maximality criterion to be checked for a solution.
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(i) PSPACE-complete for general constraints in Co,
(ii) Π Pk+3-complete if k is the maximal nesting depth of dynamic constraints in Co,
(iii) Π P2 -complete if Co does not involve dynamic constraints, and
(iv) DP -complete if Co = ∅.
Proof. Membership follows from Theorem 3, observing that for any given action descriptions D ′ and D ′′ , deciding D ′ ⊂ D ′′
can be done in polynomial time, i.e., that Pcheck is in P for ⊂.
Hardness in Case (i) follows from Theorem 4. For (ii) let n = k + 2 and let Φ = ∀Y Q 1X1 · · · Qn Xn E be a QBF, where
Q i = ∃ if i ≡ 1 mod 2 and Q i = ∀ otherwise. Consider
Du = D2 ∪ {caused Yi after Ai−1 ∧ Yi, caused ¬Yi after Ai−1 ∧ ¬Yi | 2 i  n},
where D2 is the action description from the proof of Theorem 4 with l = 1, Dm = {caused Yi, caused ¬Yi | Yi ∈ Y }, I = ∅,
and C = Co = {ALWAYS f ∨ g}, where
f = p1 N p1
(
. . .
(
pn−1 N p¯n−1 holds E after {An−1}
)
. . .
)
after {A1},
g =
∧
Yi∈Y
SOMETIMES holds Yi ∧ SOMETIMES holds ¬Yi,
where N = necessarily, pi = ¬ if i is odd and void otherwise, for 1  i  n− 1, and p¯n − 1 = ¬ if n is odd and void
otherwise. Then, Du is a solution to the action description update problem (Du ∪ Dm, I,C,⊂) iff Φ is true.
For (iii) let Φ = ∀Y ∃X E and consider the action description update problem (Du ∪ Dm, I,C,⊂), where Du = ∅, Dm =
{caused Yi, caused ¬Yi | Yi ∈ Y }, I = ∅, and C = Co = {ALWAYS ¬holds E ∨ g}, with g as before. The ADU problem (Du ∪
Dm, I,C,⊂) has Du = ∅ as a solution iff Φ is true.
Finally (iv), let E1 and E2 be Boolean formulas over atoms Y1 and Y2, respectively. Consider Du = {caused ¬F ,
caused F if ¬E1}, Dm = {caused F if ¬E2}, I = ∅, and C = ∅. Then, (Du ∪ Dm, I,C,⊂) has solution Du iff E1 is satisﬁ-
able and E2 is unsatisﬁable. 
We next consider solution checking for the semantic preference <weightq . Note that while Pcheck is polynomial for ⊂,
this is no longer the case for <weightq . However, intuitively whenever the complexity of Pcheck does not outweigh the
complexity of Ccheck, i.e., when we do not allow for more complex constraints in Cp than in Co , then we stay within
the same upper bounds as for ⊂. Providing also matching lower bounds yields the following result, which differs from the
previous one only if C = ∅. The intuitive reason is that for the syntactic preference also in this case a maximality check
is needed to recognize a solution, while the semantic preference is indifferent for C = ∅, which means that basically a
consistency check is suﬃcient and that every pre-solution also is a solution.
Theorem 7. Given an ADU problem (D, I,C,<weightq ) and an action description D
′ , deciding whether D ′ is a solution for it is
(i) PSPACE-complete for general constraints in C ,
(ii) Π Pk+3-complete if k is the maximal nesting depth of dynamic constraints in C ,
(iii) Π P2 -complete if C does not involve dynamic constraints, and
(iv) NP-complete if C = ∅.
Proof. Membership for (i), (ii), and (iii) follows easily from Theorems 3 and 4. For (iv), i.e. C = ∅, Pcheck is trivial for
<weightq , hence we can decide whether D
′ is a solution essentially by checking consistency.
Hardness in Case (i) follows from Theorem 4. For (ii) let n = k + 2 and consider Φ , Du , Dm , I , and Co from the proof
of Theorem 6(ii). Additionally, let Cp = {ALWAYS holds Yi,ALWAYS holds ¬Yi | Yi ∈ Y } and consider a weight of 1 for each
c ∈ Cp . Then, Du is a solution to (Du ∪ Dm, I,Co ∪ Cp,<weightq ) iff it is a solution to (Du ∪ Dm, I,Co,⊂).
For (iii) consider Φ , D , I , and Co from the proof of Theorem 6(ii). Again, let Cp = {ALWAYS holds Yi,ALWAYS holds ¬Yi |
Yi ∈ Y } with weight 1 for each c ∈ Cp . Then, for the same reason as above, Du is a solution to (Du ∪ Dm, I,Co ∪ Cp,<weightq )
iff it is a solution to (Du ∪ Dm, I,Co,⊂).
Finally (iv), let E be a Boolean formula over atoms Y and consider the ADU problem given by Du = {caused Y1 if ¬E,
caused ¬Y1 if ¬E}, Dm = ∅, I = ∅, and C = ∅. Then, Du is a solution to (Du ∪ Dm, I,C,<weightq ) iff E is satisﬁable. 
Hence, even recognizing solutions is quite hard. However, recognizing pre-solutions is easier for restricted sets of con-
straints (Θ Pk+3-complete if the maximal nesting depth of dynamic constraints in C is k, P
NP‖ -complete if C has no dynamic
constraints, and NP-complete if C = ∅). This follows easily from Theorem 4.
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6. Computing solutions
Equipped with a clear picture of the computational cost in terms of complexity for the relevant (sub-)tasks of solving an
ADU problem, we now turn to the issue of computing solutions using dedicated, deterministic algorithms.
6.1. General algorithms
With an oracle for pre-solutions, in case of the syntactic preference ⊂, we can incrementally compute a solution to an
ADU problem (D, I,C,⊂) where D = Du ∪Dm , in polynomial time using the algorithm in Fig. 5. By virtue of Theorems 5 and
6, this algorithm is worst case optimal, even when the nesting depth k of dynamic constraints is restricted, since computing
a solution needs the power of a Σ Pk+3 oracle. If the existence test for a pre-solution of (Du ∪ Dm, I,C,⊂) in Step 1 or Step 2
in fact returns some pre-solution Dn , then we can replace the respective assignment to D ′ by the assignments D ′ := Dn and
Dm := Dm \ Dn .
We remark that for semantic preferences, like <weightq , such a deterministic polynomial time procedure for computing
solutions, using an oracle for computing near solutions, does not work in general. However, in certain cases an oracle
for pre-solutions can be used effectively in a similar way. For instance, whenever the constraints in Cp can be strictly
ordered according to their (non-negative) weights, such that no subset of constraints that are before a constraint c in the
ordering can sum up to a higher weight than c. Then, in a procedure similar to Solution, one can iterate through the set
of constraints Cp once, using the oracle to determine whether pre-solutions exist to the slightly modiﬁed problem where
certain constraints from Cp are added to Co in order to determine the set of constraints from Cp satisﬁed by an optimal
solution. Once this set is known, any pre-solution of the problem where these constraints are added to Co , is a solution to
the original problem.
For the general case of <weightq with non-negative weights, for instance, a branch and bound algorithm can be devised
from Algorithm Solution that uses an oracle for pre-solutions to compute an initial solution candidate and, throughout the
computation, better candidates as usual in the style of an anytime algorithm.
For other preferences C , algorithms will have to be developed that similarly exploit the structure of C to prune the
search space effectively. If C is monotone with respect to the underlying signature, we may adapt Algorithm Solution
similarly as for <weightq to a branch and bound algorithm that aims at enumerating pre-solutions (for which e.g. techniques
as in [13] are useful) and cuts branches in the search tree if no better pre-solutions compared to the currently most
preferred ones, D1, . . . , Dm , can be found in them; more precisely, any branch for a (partial) pre-solution D can be cut
such that D ∪ {
1, . . . , 
m} C Di for some Di . Note that every solution preferred under C is also preferred under set-
inclusion, and we can adapt in the same way the variant of Algorithm Solution that exploits pre-solutions returned by the
oracle. This scheme may be further reﬁned, as usual, by exploiting properties like solution dominance (for each possible
solution D ′ such that D ⊆ D ′ ⊆ {
1, . . . , 
m}, one of the solutions Di is preferred); further investigation remains for future
work.
6.2. Pre-solutions
Pre-solutions to a given ADU problem may be non-deterministically computed as in the membership part of Theorem 5,
or may be obtained from a QBF encoding using a QBF solver. We present here a different computation method, which
builds on update descriptions and “update ﬂuent sets.” Roughly, rather than to consider varying update descriptions, in
this method the problem is compiled into a single action description, called the update description, in which special update
ﬂuents govern the inclusion and exclusion of causal laws. Determining an update then amounts to determine an appropriate
update ﬂuent set, which is semantically deﬁned and may be computed by constraint satisfaction and state set generation
algorithms.
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Deﬁnition 10. Let D = Du ∪ Dm be an action description with signature 〈F,A〉. The update description U (D) is the action
description obtained from D as follows:
(1) Extend 〈F,A〉 by a set H of k = |Dm| new ﬂuents (called update ﬂuents) H1, . . . , Hk;
(2) label each static law (4) in Dm with a ﬂuent Hi ∈ H:
caused L if G ∧ Hi, (15)
and each dynamic law (5) in Dm with a ﬂuent Hi ∈ H:
caused L if G after H ∧ Hi, (16)
such that no two laws are labeled by the same ﬂuent Hi ;
(3) for each Hi labeling a law, add the dynamic law:
inertial Hi,¬Hi . (17)
We next deﬁne update ﬂuent sets. To this end, we deﬁne, given an action description Du ∪ Dm and a set of constraints C
on the same signature, a partitioning SUC , S
U¬C of the state set SU of the update description U = U (D) of Du ∪ Dm having the
set H of update ﬂuents, as follows. For any two states s, s′ ∈ SU let s =H s′ iff s∩H= s′ ∩H, and let SUH,s = {s′ ∈ SU | s′ =H s}.
Given a constraint c and state s ∈ SU , we say that c holds at s w.r.t. SUH,s , if in Case (i) c is existential (9), E, s′ | Q holds
at some s′ ∈ SUH,s; (ii) c is universal (10), E, s′ | Q holds at all s′ ∈ SUH,s; (iii) c is a Boolean combination of existential and
universal constraints ci , the combination evaluates to true if each ci has the value at s w.r.t. SUH,s . Then, S
U
C = {s ∈ SU | c
holds at s w.r.t. SUH,s , for all c ∈ C}. Furthermore, in the rest of this section, we identify states with the sets of ﬂuents which
are true at that state.
Deﬁnition 11. An update (ﬂuent) set for U relative to C is a set M⊆ H such that
(i) s ∩H=M for some s ∈ SU , and
(ii) SUH,s ⊆ SUC .
With the notions above, we can compute a pre-solution to an ADU problem (D, I, C,C ), where D = Du ∪ Dm , with the
Algorithm Pre-Solution shown in Fig. 6. The key to its correctness is the following proposition.
Proposition 4. Let (D, I,C,C ) be an ADU problem, with D = Du ∪ Dm. Let U be the update description of D ∪ I = Du ∪ I ∪ Dm,
and let W denote a subset of Dm containing laws labeled by the elements M ⊆ H in U . Then D ′ = Du ∪ I ∪ W is a pre-solution to
(D, I,C,C ) iff M is an update set for U relative to Co.
The proof of this correspondence result, which is technically involving, is given in Appendix B. It follows the intuition
that by considering an update set for D∪ I relative to Co and ‘adding’ the corresponding labeled laws (which by construction
are from Dm) to Du ∪ I , one ends up with an action description D ′ that satisﬁes Co . The essential argument is by showing
that for any state s of D ′ , s ∪M is a state of U , and due to Condition (ii) of Deﬁnition 11 it is a state in SUCo , which in turn
implies that s ∈ SD ′Co , i.e., that D ′ | Co . Moreover, Condition (i) of Deﬁnition 11 guarantees that D ′ is consistent. Vice versa,
to every pre-solution corresponds an update set M , given by the labels of the modiﬁable laws included in the pre-solution.
From Proposition 4, the correctness of Algorithm Pre-Solution is then easily established.
Theorem 8. Let (D, I,C,C ) be an ADU problem, with D = Du ∪ Dm. Then Algorithm Pre-Solution outputs some pre-solution of
(D, I,C,C ) if and only if some pre-solution of (D, I,C,C ) exists.
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of near solutions: to this end, in Step 3 we take a maximal one. We also note that Step 1 is not necessary as far as
mere computation of any pre-solution is concerned. However, in the view of ADU problem solving it may be worthwhile
to particularly return D ∪ I ﬁrst, if it is a pre-solution, since it constitutes the case where I can be incorporated without
modiﬁcation to D . This is in particular relevant for preference relations C that are non-minimizing, as then in fact a
solution is output.
Example 6. Consider an ADU problem (D, I,C,C ) given by D , I , and C as presented in Example 1. Note that D ∪ I | C (as
explained in Example 1). We obtain the following update description U of Du ∪ I ∪ Dm , which contains Du ∪ I and the laws:
caused TvON if PowerON ∧ H1,
caused ¬TvON if ¬PowerON ∧ H2,
inertial Hi,¬Hi (1 i  2).
According to the transition diagram described by U , we have that action PushPBRC is not executable, i.e., constraint (3):
ALWAYS executable {PushPBRC} is violated at any state s ⊇ {PowerON,TvON, H1}. Moreover, at any state s ⊇ {PowerON,
TvON} such that H2 /∈ s, constraint (13):
ALWAYS holds PowerON ∧ TvON ⊃
¬necessarily (holds TvON) after {PushPBTV}
is not satisﬁed due to missing causation for ¬TvON. At every state of U , however, constraint (14): ALWAYS executable
{PushPBTV } is satisﬁed. We thus obtain
SU¬C =
{
s ∈ SU ∣∣ s satisﬁes H1 ∨ ¬H2},
and, for instance, {PowerON,TvON, H2} ∈ SUC . Therefore, {H2} is an update set for U relative to C , and obviously it is the
only one. Hence, if we add the law labeled by H2 to Du ∪ I , or equivalently remove the law caused TvON if PowerON, which
is labeled by H1, from D ∪ I , we obtain a pre-solution to the problem (cf. also Example 1).
Example 7. Consider a slight variant of the previous Example 6, where also the dynamic laws in D (except for the inertia
laws) are modiﬁable, and with the following causal laws added to Dm:
caused TvON after PushPBTV ∧ ¬PowerON,
caused ¬TvON after PushPBTV ∧ PowerON.
The transition diagram described by D∪ I is the same as in Fig. 4, and thus for the same reasons as mentioned in Example 1,
D ∪ I | C . The update description U of Du ∪ I ∪ Dm consists of Du ∪ I , the labeled laws as presented in Example 6, and the
following causal laws:
caused PowerON after PushPBTV ∧ ¬PowerON ∧ H3,
caused ¬PowerON after PushPBTV ∧ PowerON ∧ H4,
caused TvON after PushPBTV ∧ ¬PowerON ∧ H5,
caused ¬TvON after PushPBTV ∧ PowerON ∧ H6,
inertial Hi,¬Hi (3 i  6).
Constraint (3): ALWAYS executable {PushPBRC} is still violated according to the transition diagram described by U , since the
action PushPBRC is not executable whenever s ⊇ {PowerON,TvON, H1}. Let us consider the remaining states s of U , i.e., only
those such that H1 /∈ s. We ﬁrst observe that a violation of constraint (13):
ALWAYS holds PowerON ∧ TvON ⊃
¬necessarily (holds TvON) after {PushPBTV}
is witnessed by any such state where s ⊇ {PowerON,TvON}, H6 /∈ s, and either H2 /∈ s or H4 /∈ s (or both), since there is no
causation for ¬TvON when executing PushPBTV . Finally, constraint (14): ALWAYS executable {PushPBTV } does not hold at any
such state s where the power and the TV are off, i.e., s ∩ {PowerON,TvON} = ∅, if {H2, H5} ⊆ s and H3 /∈ s. More formally,
SU¬C =
{
s ∈ SU ∣∣ s satisﬁes H1 ∨ (¬H6 ∧ (¬H2 ∨ ¬H4))∨ (¬H3 ∧ H2 ∧ H5)}.
Two update sets for U relative to C are {H3, H4, H5, H6} and {H2, H3, H4, H6}. (That they actually constitute update sets
is witnessed, e.g., by {H3, H4, H5, H6} ∈ SU and {H2, H3, H4, H6} ∈ SU , respectively.) We may choose either one and, byC C
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for instance, none of the pre-solutions is a solution, as removing caused TvON if PowerON is suﬃcient. This is reﬂected by
the (maximal) update set {H2, H3, H4, H5, H6}.
Algorithm Pre-Solution can be run in polynomial space, and is thus within the worst case optimal bounds. Indeed, the
update description U for D and C can be easily computed in polynomial time, and after the consistency and constraint
fulﬁllment check in Step 1, the bulk of the work is with Step 3, i.e., to compute an update set M. Here, we can resort to
different methods. If the full state set SU of U would be explicitly given, then Step 3 is clearly feasible in polynomial time.
Otherwise, we can use an algorithm that enumerates SU , and for each state s generated take s ∩H as candidate update set
M for which condition (ii) SUH,s ⊆ SUC is tested using constraint satisfaction; a brief outline is as follows. Let Fs =
∧
Hi∈M Hi ∧∧
Hi∈H\M ¬Hi ; intuitively, Fs holds at a state s′ iff s′ belongs to SUH,s . Then, for each existential constraint c of form (9),
deﬁne cs = SOMETIMES holds Fs ∧ Q , and for each universal constraint c of form (10), deﬁne cs = ALWAYS holds Fs ⊃ Q .
For a Boolean combination c of existential and universal constraints, we deﬁne cs as the constraint obtained by rewriting
each occurrence of an existential or universal constraint as described above. Then SUH,s ⊆ SUC is equivalent to U | cs for each
constraint c in C .
Thus, one can build algorithms to compute pre-solutions of an ADU on top of basic reasoning services for action descrip-
tions that generate sets of states and allow for checking the satisfaction of constraints (as supported e.g. in AD-Constraint
[21], under some limitations), which are applied to the update description U (D). Compared to a simple search over the
pre-solution candidates D ′ such that Du ∪ I ⊆ D ′ ⊆ D ∪ I and testing whether D ′ | Co , this approach has some attractive
advantages. One is that we may compile the transition diagram of U (D) into an eﬃcient representation (e.g., into binary
decision diagrams that are customary in eﬃcient processing of transition-based formalisms), and perform state generation
and check constraint fulﬁllment over this single representation, rather than to consider reasoning over varying transition
diagrams, which may have considerable management cost (setting up data structures anew, etc.) at least without further
precaution and effort.
Furthermore, the update description is a useful basis for iterated Markovian (history-less) updates under lazy evaluation,
and more generally for realizing non-Markovian semantics of sequences of updates I1, . . . , Ik , in analogy to update programs
in the context of logic programming updates [5,20]. In the Markovian case, the result of updating an action description D is
obtained by incorporating the Ii , i = 1, . . . ,k one after the other into D . The update description U (D) may be generalized
to capture such iterative updates rather easily, by using time stamped copies of action descriptions that are suitably linked,
and modifying the preference ordering C appropriately into a prioritized version. In the non-Markovian case, linkage and
preference ordering can be tailored to realize particular update semantics. Investigating this is left for further work.
7. Examples: updating the Zoo World into a Circus
The Zoo World is an action domain proposed by Erik Sandewall in his Logic Modelling Workshop. It consists of several
cages and the exterior, gates between them, and animals of several species, including humans. Actions in this domain
include moving within and between cages, opening and closing gates, and mounting and riding animals. This domain was
described in the action language C+ in [1].
We present two examples for updating the action description of the Zoo World in C (derived from the one in [1])
such that we obtain a description for a Circus. The ﬁrst example illustrates the applicability of our method for computing
pre-solutions; the second example illustrates the usefulness of the decomposability theorem.
7.1. Singing and mounting in the Circus
Suppose that we would like to update the action description of the Zoo World in C in such a way to obtain a description
for a Circus by taking into account the following new information: a human can sing; and when he does, he becomes happy
if he is also mounted on an animal. We also want to ensure the following condition: different from the Zoo World, in a
Circus, the humans are expected to mount on each other, who further can mount on a large animal.
First, we transform the description of [1] into the action language C; the modiﬁed description is available in Appendix C.
Next, we describe the new information I by the following causal laws. Suppose that h ranges over constants denoting
humans, and anml ranges over constants denoting animals in the zoo:
caused Happy(h) if True after Sing(h)∧Mounted(h,anml).
Note that both h and anml are schematic variables; so the above expression stands for a set of “ground” causal laws.
Next, we identify the causal laws Dm that could be modiﬁed. The modiﬁcations we desire are about the mounting action
in particular, so let Dm consist of the following causal laws. Suppose that h, h1 range over constants denoting humans, anml
ranges over constants denoting animals in the zoo, and p ranges over positions in the zoo.
• If a human tries to mount an animal that doesn’t change position, mounting is successful:
causedMounted(h,anml) if Pos(anml, p) after Pos(anml, p)∧Mount(h,anml). (18)
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• A human cannot attempt to mount a human who is mounted:
caused False if True afterMount(h,h1)∧Mounted(h1,anml). (19)
• A human cannot be mounted on a human who is mounted:
caused False ifMounted(h,h1)∧Mounted(h1,anml). (20)
We assume that our little Circus has two humans (a small boy named Bart and an adult named Homer) and an elephant
(Jumbo). We assume that our Circus has the same landscape as the little Zoo as in [1]: there is a cage, with four positions
inside; outside the cage are four positions as well (Fig. 7).
We can express the desired conditions (or scenarios) in this little Circus by constraints. For instance, consider the fol-
lowing scenario of three steps: Initially, Jumbo and Bart are at different positions in the cage, and Homer is outside the
cage; Homer is not happy. It should be possible at some point that ﬁrst Homer mounts on Jumbo and next Bart mounts on
Homer, so that in the end Homer is mounted on Jumbo, Bart is mounted on Homer, and Homer is happy. Suppose also that
Jumbo does not change its location during the whole scenario. We can describe this scenario by the following constraint C :
SOMETIMES∨
l =l′′, l,l′′<5, l′>4
holds Pos(Bart, l)∧ Pos(Homer, l′)∧ Pos(Jumbo, l′′)∧¬Happy(Homer)∧
(
possiblyMounted(Bart,Homer)∧Mounted(Homer, Jumbo)∧
Happy(Homer) afterMount(Homer, Jumbo);Mount(Bart,Homer)∨
possiblyMounted(Bart,Homer)∧Mounted(Homer, Jumbo)∧
Happy(Homer) after True;Mount(Homer, Jumbo);Mount(Bart,Homer))∧∨
l′′<5
evolves Pos
(
Jumbo, l′′
);True;Pos(Jumbo, l′′);True;Pos(Jumbo, l′′);
True;Pos(Jumbo, l′′);True;Pos(Jumbo, l′′);True;Pos(Jumbo, l′′);True;
Pos
(
Jumbo, l′′
);True;Pos(Jumbo, l′′). (21)
We can present this constraint to CCalc (as in Fig. 14 of Appendix C); and CCalc ﬁnds out that this scenario is not possible
within the Zoo World.
Let us ﬁnd a pre-solution D ′ to the ADU problem (D, I,C,⊂), by applying Algorithm 6. For that, ﬁrst we construct the
update description U of the Zoo World:
(1) We introduce update ﬂuents as auxiliary ﬂuents of the following three forms Aux1(h,anml,p), Aux2(h,h1,anml), and
Aux3(h,h1,anml).
(2) We add new causal laws to make them inertial
inertial Aux1(h,anml, p),Aux2(h,h1,anml),Aux3(h,h1,anml)
inertial ¬Aux1(h,anml, p),¬Aux2(h,h1,anml),¬Aux3(h,h1,anml).
(3) We replace the causal laws (18)–(20) with the following causal laws respectively
causedMounted(h,anml) if Pos(anml, p) after Pos(anml, p)∧
Mount(h,anml)∧ Aux1(h,anml, p)
caused False if True afterMount(h,h1)∧Mounted(h1,anml)∧
Aux2(h,h1,anml)
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Aux3(h,h1,anml).
After that, we can check whether the scenario represented by the constraint (21) is possible if we keep all the causal laws,
except for those labeled by Aux2(Bart, Homer, Jumbo) and Aux3(Bart,Homer, Jumbo). For that, we just need to modify the
CCalc constraint above by adding several lines, as shown in Fig. 15 of Appendix C. Then, CCalc ﬁnds a possible execution
of this scenario as presented in Fig. 16 of Appendix C. It suggests dropping from Dm the causal laws
caused False if True afterMount(Bart,Homer)∧Mounted(Homer, Jumbo)
caused False ifMounted(Bart,Homer)∧Mounted(Homer, Jumbo)
to update the Zoo World description into a little Circus.
7.2. Exchanging hats in the Circus
Consider a world, which involves monkeys and dogs among other animals, where only monkeys can wear hats. We can
obtain a C description D0 of such a world, from the C+ description of missionaries and cannibals exchanging hats [50]; it
can be presented to CCalc as in Fig. 17 (Appendix D).
Now consider a variation of the Zoo World described in Section 7.1, which involves also monkeys and dogs, where only
monkeys can wear hats. This variation of the Zoo World can be described by the union of the Zoo World description D1
discussed in Section 7.1 (Figs. 8–13, Appendix C) and the description D0 mentioned above.
Suppose that we would like to update the action description D0 ∪ D1 of this extended Zoo World, to obtain a description
of a Circus where not only humans can mount on each other who further can mount on a large animal, but also animals can
exchange hats with each other. Assume that the modiﬁable part D1m of D
1 is the same as in Section 7.1, and the modiﬁable
part of D0m of D
0 consists of the following causal laws:
caused False if Owner(ha,anml)
where ha ranges over hats, and anml ranges over animals except monkeys.
We assume that our little Circus has the same landscape as in Fig. 7; and it contains two humans (a small boy Bart and
an adult Homer), an elephant (Jumbo), a dog (Snoopy), three monkeys (a small monkey Abu and two large monkeys), and
two hats. In this little Circus, in addition to the desired conditions (or scenarios) presented in Section 7.1 by the set C1 of
constraints (21), we also consider the following scenario: initially, Snoopy and Abu are wearing hats; they exchange hats at
least once. We can express this condition by the constraints C0:
SOMETIMES(
evolves Owner(ha1,Abu)∧ Owner(ha2, Snoopy); exchange(ha1,ha2);True∨
evolves Owner(ha1,Abu)∧ Owner(ha2, Snoopy);True;True;
exchange(ha1,ha2);True∨
evolves Owner(ha1,Abu)∧ Owner(ha2, Snoopy);True;True;
True;True;True; exchange(ha1,ha2);True),
where ha1 and ha2 range over hats. This constraint can be presented to CCalc as in Fig. 18 (Appendix D).
Here, we can update D0 ∪ D1 relative to C0 ∪ C1. On the other hand, since ((D0,∅,C0), (D1,∅,C1)) is a near-
decomposition of (D0 ∪ D1,∅,C0 ∪ C1,⊂), by Theorem 1, we can update D0 and D1 separately, in parallel. Considering
the computation time CCalc takes to verify given constraints, the latter approach takes much less time. With the former
approach, CCalc veriﬁes constraints C0 ∪ C1 with respect to a propositional theory of size 20450 atoms and 398430 clauses
(obtained from the update description of D0 ∪ D1) in about 9 minutes (including the grounding and completion time). With
the latter approach, CCalc veriﬁes C0 with respect to a propositional theory of size 164 atoms and 766 clauses (obtained
from the update description of D0) in less than a second (including the grounding and completion time); and it veriﬁes C1
with respect to a propositional theory of size 5462 atoms and 60567 clauses (obtained from the update description of D1)
in less than 30 seconds (including the grounding and completion time).
8. Discussion
8.1. Related work
Updating and revising knowledge bases has been studied extensively in the context of both databases and AI, with
different approaches, and in various representation frameworks, see e.g. [67,34,57] and references therein. The relation of
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a given situation can be modeled as the change of a theory representing the current state by a formula representing the
action effects. However, compared to reasoning in action languages, such an approach leaves the action under consideration
and its effects rather implicit. Therefore, we restrict our attention to those works that either treat the notion of an action
explicitly in the language, or that are otherwise more closely related to our work.
Sakama and Inoue’s work [61] is similar to our work in that it also studies update problems in a non-monotonic frame-
work (yet in logic programming) and considers the same criterion of minimal change. It deals with three kinds of updates
to a knowledge base D: theory update of D by some new information I , inconsistency removal from D , and view update
of D = Du ∪ Dm by some new information I . In the context of reasoning about actions and change, these kinds of updates
are expressible as ADU problems (D, I,∅,⊂), (D,∅,∅,⊂), and (Du ∪ Dm ∪ I),∅,∅,⊂). Sakama and Inoue show in [61] that
checking for solution existence is NP-hard for each problem; this complies with Theorem 5(iii). An important difference
to [61] is that in an ADU problem (D, I,C,⊂), the constraints C may not be directly expressed in D . Moreover, the se-
mantics of an action description D in C is a transition diagram, and only captured by all answer sets of a logic program
corresponding to D by known transformations.
Li and Pereira [44] and Liberatore [47] study, like we do, theory update problems in the context of reasoning about
actions and change, based on an action language (but language A instead of C). New information, I , contains facts describing
observations over time (e.g., the action PushPBRC occurs at time stamp 0). The action language C we use is more expressive
than A in that it accommodates non-determinism and concurrency, and the changes in the world are not only due to direct
effects of actions. To formulate temporal observations, we can extend our constraint language by formulas of the shapes
E occurs at ti, (22)
P holds at ti, (23)
where E is an action name, P is a ﬂuent name, and ti is a time stamp; a state s satisﬁes a constraint (22) resp. (23) if, for
some history (11) such that s = s0, E is in Ai+1 resp. si satisﬁes P .
Our notion of consistency of an action description D (in essence, the existence of a state) is different from that of Zhang
in [68]. They describe action domains in propositional dynamic logic, and require for consistency the existence of some
model of an action description. Different from the setting here, conﬂicting action effects may prevent any model. With the
extension of our constraint language discussed above, other forms of consistency studied in [68] can be achieved in our
framework, by describing possible scenarios or formulas as constraints.
Some of the related work mentioned above, like [6,49,3,37], study action description updates in connection with the
problem of elaboration tolerance. The goal is to answer the following question: how can an action description be updated
to tolerate new elaborations on the action domain? [37] studies the update problem in the context of dynamic logic [35].
Here action domains are represented in a simpliﬁed version of dynamic logic. An action domain description consists of static
laws (e.g., Up → Light, which expresses that “if the switch is up then the light is on”), effect laws for actions (e.g., ¬Up →
[Toggle]Up, which expresses that “whenever the switch is down, after toggling it, the room is lit up”), and executability
laws for actions (e.g., ¬Broken → 〈Toggle〉, which expresses that “toggle cannot be executed if the switch is broken”).
To handle the frame problem and the ramiﬁcation problem, a consequence relation is built (in a meta-language) over
the action description. Note that the action description language C does not require such a meta-language to be able to
handle these problems. In this formal framework for reasoning about actions and change, the authors consider revising
beliefs about states of the world (as in, e.g., [38,62]), as well as revising beliefs about the action laws. They update action
descriptions with respect to some elaborations (described also by causal laws), by modifying the causal laws in the action
description by ﬁrst “contraction” and then “expansion.” In the end, the antecedents of some causal laws in the action
description are strengthened with respect to the new elaborations. Consider the example above; during a blackout, the
agent toggles the switch when it is down, and the room is still dark. A respective elaboration is described by a causal
law, like Blackout → [Toggle]Light, which is to be contracted from the action description. The action description is modiﬁed
by this elaboration, by ﬁrst contracting the effect laws (e.g., ¬Up → [Toggle]Up) and then expanding the theory with the
weakened laws (e.g., ¬Up ∧ ¬Blackout → [Toggle]Up). The idea behind modifying a theory with an elaboration of the form
φ → [a]ψ in this way, is to ensure two conditions when φ does not hold: ﬁrst a still has the effect ψ ; and second a has
no effect except on those literals that are consequences of ¬ψ . The semantics of such syntactic operations are given in
terms of changes (e.g., addition/removal of edges) in the transition diagram. Note that [37] modiﬁes causal laws to tolerate
elaborations, whereas we add new causal laws (which may be obtained from some observations, or which may describe
some elaborations) to the original description and furthermore we drop a minimal set of causal laws from the original
theory so that given constraints (which may describe some desired/preferred conditions on the domain) are satisﬁed by
the updated description. In other words, [37] is less suitable for the incorporation of new information compared to our
approach. For instance in the example given above, elaborating w.r.t. the effect law Blackout → [ReplaceFuse]Blackout will
not serve the intended purpose to incorporate the effects of replacing a broken fuse, while in our approach we simply
update with the causal law caused ¬Blackout after ReplaceFuse∧ Blackout for this purpose.
Another related work that studies action description updates, for elaboration tolerance, is [3]. The authors introduce an
action description language, called Evolp Action Programs (EAPs), built upon the update language Evolp [4]. This language
can be used to represent action domains, as well as their updates due to some elaborations. An action domain description
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some step n the switch is down and the switch is toggled at step n, then Light ← Up becomes true at step n + 1), inertial
declarations (e.g., inertial(Light)), and initialize declarations (e.g., initialize(Light) which stands for Light ← prev(Light) where
prev(F ) is a new atom introduced for describing the value of ﬂuent F in the previous state) introduced for representing
inertia. Note that in the action language C , there is no need to introduce new atoms to be able to handle the frame problem.
An elaboration is encoded as a separate action description D , and then “asserted” to the main description, using the assert
construct of Evolp. The semantics of an EAP (and thus the assert construct) is given by means of stable models [29]. Adding
assert(D) to the initial description is different from adding D: like our approach it ensures static consistency of the resulting
action description (if the update itself is consistent); preference is implicitly given by set inclusion, i.e., maximal consistent
subsets of the initial laws are retained. Another similarity to our work is that updates that consist of static/dynamic rules
are described in the same language as the action description. Additionally, the language of [3] allows to specify changes of
rules, as a part of an update (using the assert construct). For instance, consider adding assert(Light ← Up) ← Toggle to an
action description. Then, when the switch is toggled, the rule Light ← Up remains inertially true until its truth is possibly
deleted afterwards. However, apart from rather cumbersome language extensions for handling the frame problem, EAPs do
not provide a means to specify certain dynamic requirements that an update might have to satisfy (in particular universal
properties quantifying over all states), which is a main feature of our approach. For instance, in the setting of Example 1,
translating D and I into a respective EAP would represent an update equivalent to the action description D ∪ I , i.e., one that
does not satisfy the constraints C . Since the constraints cannot be expressed in the language, additional analysis is needed
to identify an update I ′ (different from I), which would enforce the required behavior when asserted to the initial action
description D .
The works by Lifschitz [49] and by Balduccini and Gelfond [6] are similar to [3] in that they also modify action de-
scriptions with respect to new elaborations, by means of adding causal laws, in the sense of additive elaboration tolerance
[52,55]. Lifschitz describes in [49] an action domain in language C such that every causal law is defeasible (by means of an
abnormality predicate). To formulate some other variations of the domain, the agent can just add new causal laws, some of
which “disable” some existing causal laws. In [6], the authors extend an action description, encoded as a logic program, with
“consistency restoring” rules, so that when the action description and given observations are incompatible, these rules can
be “applied” to get some consistent answer set. This, however, is more geared towards handling exceptions (no causal laws
are modiﬁed). The approaches provide tools for the user to enact updates (by defeating causal laws, respectively by applying
consistency restoring rules), but different from our approach, no particular modiﬁcations are characterized from ﬁrst princi-
ples as “intended” solutions of an update problem, which remains with the user. While adding abnormality predicates [49]
is a simple technique that does not support preference constraints, [6] (which is more geared towards diagnosis) requires
to anticipate all possible updates in order to encode a priori solutions for potential inconsistencies with subsequent updates
into the initial domain description at design time; the support for preferences on consistency restoring rules is limited, e.g.,
cardinality based preferences are diﬃcult to represent. Furthermore, as the result of updating an action description is not
an action description, adjustments for iterated updates are necessary.
Concerning results on the computational complexity, Eiter and Gottlob [23] study a number of syntax-based as well
as model-based knowledge base revision operators and provide precise complexity characterizations for the problem of
checking whether a given formula is derivable from a revised (updated) knowledge base by reducing the problem to the
evaluation of counterfactuals. Herzig [36] improved these complexity bounds for restricted settings under Winslett’s Possible
Models Approach. Liberatore [46] considers further approaches for belief update from the literature, derived corresponding
complexity results, and extended them to the problem of iterated update. Baral and Zhang [7] considers the complexity
of model checking for knowledge update. As for traditional belief update, the relation to reasoning about actions consists
in regarding the effects of an action as an update to the current state. However, motivated by sensing actions that do not
change the world, Baral and Zhang distinguish knowledge updates as belief updates where changes not only correspond
to alterations of the real world but may also be affect an agent’s knowledge about the world. They give a model theoretic
account of knowledge updates based on modal logics, show that the complexity of model checking is on the second layer
of the polynomial hierarchy, and identify tractable subclasses.
More closely related to our work are investigations concerning the complexity of reasoning about actions in an action
language. For the action language A, Liberatore [45] establishes, for instance, NP-completeness of consistency checking and
coNP-completeness for entailment, which essentially amounts to checking whether D | ALWAYS necessarily (holds F ) after
A1; . . . ; An , for a given action description D , a ﬂuent F , and a sequence of actions A1; . . . ; An in our setting. Lang et al. [42]
investigated the computational complexity of the progression problem for simple causal action theories which constitute a
special case of causal theories in different languages, in particular capturing the fragment of action language C that we con-
sidered. Besides the progression problem, the complexity of other reasoning tasks, including executability and determinism,
is addressed in this framework which is further extended to so-called generalized action theories. We remark that, like for
progression, several of these results can be obtained as special cases of deciding D | c for particular constraints c in our
setting. Moreover, to the best of our knowledge, the complexity of deciding constraint fulﬁllment has not been addressed
so far (apart from the PSPACE result for the general case for the constraint language we considered, which has been proven
in [18]), let alone the problem of updating action descriptions in the presence of constraints.
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As stated in the problem description, our approach is intended to also allow for designed (normative) worlds that are
represented by means of action descriptions, where changes thus are considered to be updates rather than revisions. How-
ever, as already brieﬂy mentioned in Section 3, our notion of action update has more of a belief revision than a belief update
ﬂavor. This view is supported by a deeper analysis of change in connection with reasoning about actions and change [41,58].
Lang [41] describes a scope for revision and for update, and he notices that, as pointed out by [27,28], the scope cannot
be simply decided by whether the theory is about static vs. dynamic worlds. Then, as also pointed out by [10,14], Lang re-
lates revision and update by means of backward–forward reasoning, in particular, by means of action progression. According
to [41], belief revision is to correct some initial beliefs about the past/present/future state of the world by some observations
about the past/present state of the world. On the other hand, belief update by some formula α corresponds to progressing
the theory by a speciﬁc feedback-free action that will make α true with respect to a given update operator; here α does
not describe observations. In this framework, Lang says that our approach is closer to a revision process than to an update;
however, since our approach changes the transition diagram of an action description, it is meaningful to consider it as an
update process as well.
However, update and revision behave for our problem technically not much different: while informally, revision operators
aim at selecting models of the new information that are closest to the models of the knowledge base globally, update opera-
tors change each model of the knowledge base locally (this is intuitively captured by the axiom U8 of the KM postulates). As
each action description D has a unique associated model given by T (D), the two methods yield the same result. The main
difference remaining is the behavior on inconsistent action descriptions. Revision with consistent information must make an
inconsistent knowledge base consistent (as done in our approach), while update must preserve inconsistency. Clearly, our
method can be easily adapted to this behavior, and thus show an update ﬂavor.
The AGM and KM postulates [2,39] are based on several assumptions that do not hold for the action language C . One re-
quirement which is not met is that of an underlying formal language which is governed by a logic, i.e., which is closed under
Boolean connectives. Other requirements, including super-classicality, modus ponens, and the deduction theorem, essentially
restrict to formalisms with an underlying monotonic logic (an explicit restriction for instance in Hansson’s work [33]). How-
ever, the action language C is non-monotonic. For instance, if D consists of the single law
caused P if P
where P is the single ﬂuent, then the transition diagram described by D , T (D), has two states s1 = {P }, s2 = {¬P }, and
two transitions 〈s1,∅, s1〉 and 〈s2,∅, s1〉. Thus the causal law caused P after ∅ is satisﬁed by T (D) (equivalently, D |
ALWAYS necessarily holds P after ∅), and can be seen a semantic consequence of D . However, if we add
caused ¬P if ¬P
to D , then T (D) has additional transitions (〈s1,∅, s2〉 and 〈s2,∅, s2〉) and D | ALWAYS necessarily holds P after ∅; thus
caused P after ∅ is no longer a semantic consequence. The AGM framework, and similarly the KM framework, is not
suitable for non-monotonic settings, as discussed, e.g., for non-monotonic logic programming in [20] and for defeasible logic
in [9]. This has been conﬁrmed by our study of KM-style properties in Section 4, where non-monotonicity turned out to
be the reason for several properties to fail. Thus governing our action description updates with the AGM or KM postulates
is not meaningful; and intuitively the same is true for postulates for contraction developed in monotonic settings. We
refrained from a formal investigation in this direction due to another reason however: action language C is not closed
under complement, more precisely it is neither deﬁned nor clear what the complement of an action language should be, or
how it is represented. As a consequence, it does not constitute a logic and well-known identities, like the Levi Identity used
in classical belief change settings to relate contraction, expansion, and revision, cannot be applied.
By the counterexamples for KM postulates given in Section 4, it also becomes clear that the same results are obtained
for less general, alternative deﬁnitions. For instance, one may consider an initial action description D0, and a set of con-
straints C0, as the initial knowledge to be modiﬁed by new information, which consists of a set of causal laws D1, and a
set of constraints C1, which are considered to hold for sure in a solution. Preference is given to solutions that keep a max-
imal sets of the original laws and constraints (w.r.t. set inclusion), such that the resulting action description is consistent
and satisﬁes—in addition to all constraints in C1—also all constraints from C0 that are kept. Note that in our setting, this is
amounts to a particular case where D = Dm = D0, Co = C1, Cp = C0, and C is deﬁned by D ′ C D ′′ iff D ′ ⊆ D ′′ , D ′Cp ⊆ D ′′Cp ,
and one of the inclusions is strict, where DCp = {c ∈ Cp | D | c}, for any action description D . Note that all counterexamples
stated in Section 4 are also counterexamples for this setting. We further remark that the other properties (except for those
that require strongly minimizing C , which is not the case for the above preference relation), and in particular results on
computational complexity, hold for this particular setting as well.
An AGM- respectively KM-style theory for non-monotonic logics with signiﬁcant attention is, to our knowledge, still
missing. We note that [38], for instance, considers the incorporation of belief change into the ﬂuent calculus, geared by
an axiomatic treatment of belief revision and update satisfying the AGM and KM postulates, respectively. However, the
underlying logic is monotonic and only static knowledge is subject to change, and preference is based on a ranking of
states. Another notable work is [26], which considers the revision of rational preference orderings that underly certain (non-
monotonic) consequence operators. However, in order to avoid shortcomings concerning the general principles of success
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concerning the knowledge bases and the conditionals (akin to laws in our setting) admissible for revision. More closely
related to our setting is a very recent approach to belief revision for answer-set programs [15] with an operator that satisﬁes
the majority of the AGM postulates. This is achieved by building on a strong underlying notion of equivalence (so-called
strong equivalence), using a respective monotonic formal characterization of answer-set programs called SE-models, and by
applying well-known techniques from classical belief revision. Applying similar methods to action language C in order to
come up with a theory-revision operator is an interesting subject for future work. Work by Turner [63] on SE-models for
causal theories may serve as a starting point. However, several issues are not immediate and need further consideration.
For instance, a direct application of Turner’s SE-models to laws in C is achieved for static laws only, while it is the dynamic
laws which we are mainly interested in for revision. Hence, the concept of SE-model has to be adapted appropriately. Note
that any revision operator, respectively update operator, obtained this way is characterized by semantic structures which is
orthogonal to our aims in this article. It is not clear how the resulting semantic structures could be syntactically represented
(something which could be achieved due to a characterization of SE-models in terms of answer-set programs in [15]). Even if
a suitable representation by means of causal laws is developed, it is not likely that the resulting action description after the
change is reminiscent of the original description (see also discussions in [17] and comments on this work in the following
subsection).
8.3. Repair of action descriptions
We can sometimes improve solutions (and pre-solutions) to an ADU problem (D, I, C,C ) by considering a slightly
different version of the problem. We may take the view that a causal law is not completely wrong, and for instance holds
in certain contexts. Suppose that I is a dynamic law of the form:
caused L′ after A′ ∧ G ′,
where L′ is a literal, G ′ is a propositional combination of ﬂuents, and A′ is an action. We can obtain an action description Ds
from D , which describes the same transition diagram as D , by replacing each dynamic law (5) in Dm with:
caused L if F after H ∧ G ′,
caused L if F after H ∧ ¬G ′.
We then have that for each pre-solution D ′ to (D, I,C,C ) there exists some pre-solution Ds ′ to (Ds, I,C,C ) which
contains D ′ as a subset (in particular, for subset preference ⊂, each solution to (D, I,C,⊂) gives rise to some solution
of (Ds, I,C,⊂)); with an (ad-hoc) adaptation of the solution preference C to sC , the solutions of (D, I,C,C ) can then
be recovered from the ones of (Ds, I,C,sC ). Therefore, such a replacement method can be useful to prevent “complete
removal” of some laws from the given action description. Furthermore, solutions of (Ds, I,C,sC ) which do not correspond
to solutions of the original problem (D, I,C,C ) can be viewed as approximations of solutions for the latter. They might be
of particular interest if the original problem has no solution.
Similar methods are also useful for repairing an action description, e.g., if some dynamic laws (5) in the action description
have missing formulas in H . In this case, we need to replace such causal laws by some modiﬁed statement(s) from a
candidate space. Our current framework can be generalized in this direction by changing the candidate solution space
for a solution D ′ from Du ⊆ D ′ ⊆ Du ∪ I to a set of action descriptions cand(D, I) such that Du ∪ I ⊆ D ′ holds for each
D ′ ∈ cand(D, I); if a modiﬁable causal law 
i in D gives rise to alternative candidate replacements cand(
i, I), then cand(D, I)
= {⋃ni=1 Di | Di ∈ cand(
i, I)} should hold, where D = {
1, . . . , 
n}.
We note that as for repairing action descriptions, [17] took a slightly different, semantics-oriented view for resolving
conﬂicts between an action description and a set of constraints, in the context of action language C . Conﬂicts are character-
ized by means of states and transitions in the transition diagram described by the given action description that violate some
given constraints. The goal is to resolve each conﬂict by modifying the action description, but not necessarily by deleting
some causal laws. However, the repair of a single conﬂict might be achieved by numerous alternative changes to the action
description, such that the candidate solution space is very large; furthermore, the repairs of individual conﬂicts interfere
with each other, and might introduce other conﬂicts. This led the authors of [17] to propose support for the user in terms of
reasoning services on an action description given constraints, which provide explanations for certain disorders, rather than
an automated repair; a respective tool and methodology for its usage to correct editorial errors in the knowledge represen-
tation process (e.g., by typos or omitted formula parts) are described in [21,22]. An interesting issue for further work is to
analyze under which conditions such repairs can be obtained as solutions of an ADU problem in a generalized framework
as outlined above.
9. Conclusion
In this paper, we have considered the problem of updating an action description with some new information in the
framework of action languages, where knowledge about the domain in terms of observations and other constraints is re-
spected. To this end, we have introduced a formal notion of action description update which, given an action description D ,
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language), singles out a solution to the update problem, based on a preference relation C over action descriptions.
We then studied semantical and computational properties of action updates in this framework, where we presented
among other results decomposition results and complexity characterizations of basic decision problems associated with
computing solutions, viz. deciding solution existence and solution recognition. We considered in the complexity analysis
generic settings as well as particular instances, paying attention to different classes of constraints and preference relations.
Furthermore, we presented some algorithms for computing solutions and pre-solutions (which approximate solutions), and
we discussed our work in the context of the literature.
Several issues remain for further work. Our computational results provide a basis for the realization of concrete imple-
mentations to incorporate updates into action descriptions in the action language C , based on top of existing reasoning
systems like the causal calculator [51] or AD-Constraint [21], which is an important need for deploying such systems to
applications. However, for practical concerns, eﬃcient domain-tailored algorithms will need to be developed.
In connection with this, meaningful fragments of low (polynomial) complexity are of interest; related to this is the study
of language fragments that correspond to simpler (less expressive) action languages, such as A or B (see [30]). However,
several of the intractability results that we established here involved rather simple action descriptions, which suggests that
polynomial complexity will have to be achieved by pragmatic constraints rather than logical or structural conditions. On
the other hand, also richer, more expressive action languages, such as the language C with disjunctive causal laws may
be studied, the action language C+ [43], or the action language K [19] (into which the language considered here maps
naturally) may be studied.
Further issues are to consider richer forms of constraints (e.g., by generalized action query languages), and to extend
the current computational study to further notions of preference relations. For example, to syntax-based preference using
cardinality, lexicographic ordering, or formula ranking, possibly with priority levels on top [8,11], or to semantic-based
preference that uses other weight assignments like those in [18] (which are computable in polynomial space) or preference
based on state- and transition-rankings, inspired by approaches e.g. in conditional reasoning (see [24]).
Another issue are multiple updates. The update descriptions that we presented here provide a useful basis for a real-
ization of Markovian (history-less) updates I1, I2, . . . , Ik of an action description under lazy evaluation, and may be used,
similar as update programs in the context of logic program updates [5,20], also to realize non-Markovian semantics of a
sequence of updates to an action description. However, this remains to be explored in further investigation.
Finally, in regard with connection with AGM and KM theory, postulates and properties that are tailored to theories of
action in a non-monotonic setting would be interesting.
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Appendix A. Proofs for Section 5
Theorem 4. Given an action description D and a set C of constraints, deciding D | C is
(i) PSPACE-complete in general,
(ii) Θ Pk+3-complete if k is the maximal nesting depth of dynamic constraints in C , and
(iii) PNP‖ -complete if C does not involve dynamic constraints.
Proof. Concerning (i) the result has been shown in [18]. We proceed with the proof of (ii) and (iii).
Membership: W.l.o.g. C contains a single constraint c. Let us consider (iii) ﬁrst. Then, c is a conjunction of clauses over
universal constraints of the following form: ALWAYS Q or ¬ALWAYS Q , where Q is a conjunction of clauses over static
constraints of the form holds F or ¬holds F . Checking truth of a negated universal (sub-)constraint of this form is in NP. To
do so, we non-deterministically guess a possible state s of D and verify in polynomial time that s is a state of D (satisﬁes
all static laws of D) and that s does not satisfy Q (there is a clause in Q such that none of its static constraints is satisﬁed
at s). Hence, the complementary task, i.e., checking the truth of a positive universal constraint, ALWAYS Q , is in coNP. Thus,
we can decide D | c in polynomial time with a single parallel evaluation of n NP-oracle calls, given that n is the number
of universal constraints in c. This proves PNP‖ -membership.
For (ii), the constraint c is a conjunction of clauses over universal constraints of the form ALWAYS Q or ¬ALWAYS Q ,
where Q is a conjunction of clauses over static constraints as above and over dynamic constraints of the form
necessarily Qk−1 after A1; . . . ; An or ¬necessarily Qk−1 after A1; . . . ; An , where Qk−1 is a basic constraint of nesting
depth k − 1. Let c1 − c4 denote constraints of the form c1 = ALWAYS Q , c2 = ¬ALWAYS Q , c3 = ALWAYS ¬Q , and
c4 = ¬ALWAYS ¬Q , respectively. We show by induction that deciding whether D | c is in Θ P .k+3
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A1; . . . ; An be a dynamic constraint. Deciding D | c1 is in NP since the complementary problem D | c2 is in coNP. The
latter problem is decided by non-deterministically guessing a history h = s0, A1, s1, . . . , sn−1, An, sn of length n and checking
in polynomial time that h is a history of D , i.e., that si (0  i  n) is a state of D and that 〈si, Ai+1, si+1〉 (0  i < n) is
in R . Furthermore, D, sn | ¬Qk−1 can be checked in polynomial time since Qk−1 is a propositional combination of static
constraints, witnessing D | c1. Deciding D | c3 is in Π P2 and the complementary problem D | c4 is in Σ P2 . To wit, in order
to disprove D | c3, guess a state s and—as outlined above—use the NP-oracle to verify that for all histories h of length n
emanating from s (s0 = s) it holds that D, sn | Qk−1. This establishes D, s | ¬Q and hence, D | c3. Putting all together,
in order to decide D | c, an oracle for Σ P2 problems is suﬃcient to decide the truth of any universal constraint in c. Thus,
D | c can be checked in polynomial time with a polynomial number of parallel Σ P2 -oracle calls and therefore is in Θ P3 .
Induction step: Let the nesting depth of dynamic constraints be k > 0, and assume that deciding D | Qk−1 is in Θ Pk+2
for any subconstraint of nesting depth k − 1. Then, as easily seen by the arguments for the base case above, D | I can be
decided by means of a Σ Pk+2-oracle for any universal constraint Q ∈ c. Thus, again by parallel evaluation, D | c is in Θ Pk+3.
Hardness: In order to prove (iii) we reduce the problem to the following PNP‖ -hard decision version of Maximum CNF
Satisﬁability: Given a Boolean formula F in conjunctive normal form (CNF) and an integer k, decide whether the maximum
number of clauses in F that can be simultaneously satisﬁed by an interpretation is 0 mod k.
W.l.o.g., let F be a 3-CNF formula of the form
∧n
i=1 Li,1 ∨ Li,2 ∨ Li,3, where Li, j , 1  i  n, 1  j  3, is a literal over
atoms X = {X1, . . . , Xm}. For Xi ∈ X , by ¬L we denote ¬Xi if L = Xi and Xi if L = ¬Xi . Consider the action description D1
consisting of:
caused Ci if Li,1, caused Ci if Li,2, caused Ci if Li,3,
caused ¬Ci if ¬Li,1 ∧ ¬Li,2 ∧ ¬Li,3,
}
1 i  n
caused F1,1 if C1, caused ¬F1,1 if ¬C1,
caused F1,0 if ¬C1, caused ¬F1,0 if C1,
caused Fi, j if Ci ∧ Fi−1, j−1,
caused ¬Fi, j if ¬Ci ∧ Fi−1, j−1,
}
2 i  n, 1 j  i
caused Fi, j if ¬Ci ∧ Fi−1, j,
caused ¬Fi, j if Ci ∧ Fi−1, j,
}
2 i  n, 0 j < i.
Observe that D1 contains only static laws. A state, s, consistent with D1 corresponds to an arbitrary total interpretation on
X together with a total interpretation on ﬂuents Ci , 1 i  n, such that Ci is true at s iff the interpretation on X satisﬁes
clause Ci . The latter is enforced by the ﬁrst 4n laws in D1. The remaining laws cause a total interpretation on ﬂuents Fi, j ,
1 j  i  n, such that Fi, j is true at s iff the interpretation on X satisﬁes j clauses among {C1, . . . ,Ci}.
Now consider the following constraint ck:
ALWAYS holds Fn,0 ∨
SOMETIMES holds Fn,k ∧ ALWAYS (¬holds Fn,k+1 ∧ · · · ∧ ¬holds Fn,n)∨
. . .
SOMETIMES holds Fn,lk ∧ ALWAYS (¬holds Fn,lk+1 ∧ · · · ∧ ¬holds Fn,n),
where l = n/k.
We show that the maximum number of clauses in F that can be simultaneously satisﬁed by an interpretation is 0 mod k
iff D1 | ck .
Only-if: Suppose that the maximum number o of clauses in F that can be simultaneously satisﬁed by an interpretation
is 0 mod k. Consider o = 0 ﬁrst. Then, no clause of F is satisﬁable. By construction, Fi,0 holds for 1  i  n at every
state s of D1. In particular, Fn,0 holds at every state, and therefore ALWAYS holds Fn,0 is satisﬁed by D1, i.e., D1 | ck .
Now let o > 0. W.l.o.g. o = ak for some 1  a  l. Then, by construction Fn, j is false for o < j  n at every state s of D1.
Therefore, D1 | ALWAYS (¬holds Fn,ak+1 ∧ · · · ∧¬holds Fn,n). Also by construction, Fn,o is true at a state corresponding to
an assignment that maximizes the simultaneously satisﬁed clauses. This implies D1 | SOMETIMES holds Fn,ak . Observing
that, together, these two constraints constitute a conjunct of ck , we conclude that D1 | ck .
If: Suppose D1 | ck , and assume D1 | ALWAYS holds Fn,0 ﬁrst. Then, by construction no clause in F is satisﬁable, hence
the maximum number o of clauses in F that can be simultaneously satisﬁed by an interpretation is 0 and thus o ≡ 0 mod k.
Now let any other conjunct of ck be satisﬁed by D1, i.e., for some 1 a l it holds that D1 | SOMETIMES holds Fn,ak and
D1 | ALWAYS (¬holds Fn,ak+1 ∧ · · · ∧ ¬holds Fn,n). Then, there is a state s at which Fn,ak is true. By construction, this
means that ak clauses of F can simultaneously be satisﬁed. Moreover, Fn, j is false at every state s of D1 if j > ak. Again
by construction, this implies that ak is the maximum number of clauses in F that can be simultaneously satisﬁed. Since
ak ≡ 0 mod k this proves the claim.
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Q i = ∃ if i ≡ 1 mod 2 and Q i = ∀ otherwise, Xki and Xlj , 1  i, j  n and 1  k, l  m, are pairwise disjunct sets of
propositional variables if i = j or k = l. and El is Boolean formula over atoms in Xl = Xl1 ∪ · · · ∪ Xln , such that if Φl is
false then Φl+1, . . . ,Φm are false, too. Deciding whether the maximum index o, 1  o m, such that Φo is true, is odd is
Θ Pn+1-hard.
We reduce the problem of deciding D | c for a constraint c with nesting depth k of dynamic constraints to this problem,
as follows.
Let n = k+ 2, 1 lm, and let D2 be the action description consisting of the statements:
caused F li if F
l
i after Ai−1,
caused ¬F li if ¬F li after Ai−1,
}
2 i  n, F li ∈ Xli
caused F lj after Ai−1 ∧ F lj,
caused ¬F lj after Ai−1 ∧ ¬F lj,
}
2 i  n, 1 j  n, i = j, F lj ∈ Xlj.
Observe that a state s of D2 corresponds to an arbitrary consistent total interpretation over X1 ∪ · · · ∪ Xm . Note also that
〈s, {Ai}, s′〉 (1 i  n − 1) is a transition in the transition diagram described by D2 iff all ﬂuents are interpreted identically
except those over X1i+1 ∪ · · · ∪ Xmi+1.
Consider the constraint:
co =
{∨(m−3)/2
l=0 (SOMETIMES f
2l+1 ∧ ALWAYS ¬ f 2l+2)∨ gm ifm is odd,∨(m−2)/2
l=0 (SOMETIMES f
2l+1 ∧ ALWAYS ¬ f 2l+2) otherwise,
where
gm = SOMETIMES f m, and
f l = p1 N p1
(
. . .
(
pn−1 N pn−1 holds Elafter {An−1}
)
. . .
)
after {A1},
where N = necessarily, and where pi = ¬ if i is even and pi is void otherwise, for 1 i  n− 1.
We ﬁrst prove that Φl is true iff there exists a state s of D2, such that D2, s | f l .
For the only-if direction suppose Φl is true. We show by a recursive argument that if a state s0 coincides with a
satisfying truth assignment for Φl on Xl1 then D2, s0 | f l . Assume that sn−2 is a state of D2 that coincides with a
satisfying truth assignment for Φl on Xl1 ∪ · · · ∪ Xln−1. We show that D2, sn−2 | pn−1 N pn−1 holds El after {An−1}. If
n − 1 is odd then Qn = ∀. Thus, any assignment on Xln will turn the assignment on Xl1 ∪ · · · ∪ Xln−1 given by sn−2
into a satisfying assignment for El . Thus, every transition by {An−1} from sn−2 will lead to a state sn−1 that satisﬁes
El . This proves D2, sn−2 | necessarily holds El after An−1 if n − 1 is odd. So let n − 1 be even. Then Qn = ∃. In this
case, there exists an assignment on Xln that, together with the assignment on X
l
1 ∪ · · · ∪ Xln−1 given by sn−2, is a sat-
isfying assignment for El . Thus, there is a transition by {An−1} from sn−2 to a state sn−1 that satisﬁes El . Therefore,
D2, sn−2 | ¬necessarily ¬holds El after An−1 if n − 1 is even. In any case, D2, sn−2 | pn−1 N holds pn−1 El after {An−1}.
Applying this argument recursively proves the claim that if a state s0 coincides with a satisfying truth assignment for Φl on
Xl1, then D2, s0 | f l , and thus, that there exists a state of D2 such that D2, s | f l .
For the if-direction let s be a state of D2, such that D2, s | f l . We establish the truth of Φl recursively as follows.
Let h = s, A1, s1, . . . , sn−3An−2, sn−2 be a history of D2. We show that sn−2 is a state of D2 that coincides with a truth
assignment on Xl1 ∪ · · · ∪ Xln−1, such that Qn El is true. If n − 1 is odd, then D2, sn−2 | necessarily holds El after An−1,
since D2, s | f l . Thus, any assignment on Xln will turn the assignment on Xl1 ∪ · · · ∪ Xln−1 given by sn−2 into a satisfying
assignment for El . If n − 1 is even, then D2, sn−2 | ¬necessarily ¬holds El after An−1, since D2, s | f l . Therefore, there
exists an assignment on Xln that will turn the assignment on X
l
1 ∪ · · · ∪ Xln−1 given by sn−2 into a satisfying assignment
for El . Hence, in any case Qn El is true. Applying this argument recursively proves the claim that D2, s | f l implies the
truth of Φl .
We now show that the maximum index o such that Φo is true, is odd iff D2 | co .
Only-if: Let the maximum index o such that Φo is true be odd. Consider any state s of D2 such that D2, s | f o . If o =m
this proves D2 | co . So let o <m. Then additionally D2, s | f o+1, for every state s′ of D2. Hence, D2 | SOMETIMES f o and
D2 | ALWAYS ¬ f o+1, i.e., for l = (o − 1)/2 D2 | SOMETIMES f 2l+1 ∧ ALWAYS ¬ f 2l+2. This proves D2 | co .
If: Assume D2 | co . If m is odd and D2 | gm . Then m is the maximum index o such that Φo is true, and o is odd. This
proves the claim. So consider the remaining cases, i.e., there is an index l (0 l (m−3)/2 if m is odd and 0 l (m−2)/2,
otherwise), such that D2 | SOMETIMES f 2l+1 ∧ ALWAYS ¬ f 2l+2. Then, there is a state s of D2 such that f 2l+1 is satisﬁed,
whereas f 2l+2 is not satisﬁed at any state s′ of D2. Let o = 2l + 1. We conclude that Φo is true and Φo+1 is false. Thus, o
is the maximum index such that Φo is true, and it is odd. This proves the claim and therefore Θ Pn+1-hardness, i.e., Θ Pk+3-
hardness. 
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(i) PSPACE-complete in general,
(ii) Σ Pk+3-complete, if k is the maximal nesting depth of dynamic constraints in Co,
(iii) Σ P2 -complete, if Co does not involve dynamic constraints, and
(iv) NP-complete if Co = ∅.
Proof. Membership: Follows from Theorems 3 and 4.
Hardness: Hardness in Case (i) follows from Theorem 4. For (ii) let n = k + 2 and let Φ = ∃Y Q 1X1 · · · Qn Xn E be a QBF,
where Q i = ∃ if i ≡ 0 mod 2 and Q i = ∀ otherwise. Consider
Du = D2 ∪ {caused Yi after Ai−1 ∧ Yi, caused ¬Yi after Ai−1 ∧ ¬Yi | 2 i  n},
where D2 is the action description from the proof of Theorem 4 with l = 1, Dm = {caused Yi, caused ¬Yi | Yi ∈ Y }, I = ∅,
C = Co ∪ Cp with Cp = ∅, and Co = {co}, where
co = ALWAYS p1 N p1
(
. . .
(
pn−1 N pn−1 holds E after {An−1}
)
. . .
)
after {A1},
and where N = necessarily, and pi = ¬ if i is odd and void otherwise, for 1  i  n− 1. We show that there exists a
solution to the action description update problem (Du ∪ Dm, I,C,C ) iff Φ is true.
For the only-if direction, let Du ⊆ D ′ ⊆ Du ∪ Dm be a solution. Then D ′ is consistent and states of D ′ coincide with
some interpretation on Y and an arbitrary interpretation on X1, . . . , Xn . By the same arguments as in the hardness proof of
Theorem 4(ii), the fact that D ′ | Co witnesses the truth of Φ .
For the if-direction let Φ be true. Consider a satisfying truth assignment on Y , let D ′m be the set of static causal laws
from Dm compliant with this assignment, and let D ′ = Du ∪ D ′m . Then, D ′ is consistent and Du ⊆ D ′ ⊆ Du ∪ Dm . Moreover,
by the same arguments as in the hardness proof of Theorem 4(ii), D ′ | Co . This proves that D ′ is a pre-solution, and hence
the existence of a solution.
For (iii) let Φ = ∃Y ∀X E and consider the action description update problem (Du ∪ Dm, I,C,C ), where Du = ∅, Dm =
{caused Yi, caused ¬Yi | Yi ∈ Y }, I = ∅, and C = Co = {ALWAYS holds E}. We prove that the action description update
problem (Du ∪ Dm, I,C,C ) has a solution iff Φ is true.
For the only-if direction, let Du ⊆ D ′ ⊆ Dm be a solution. Then D ′ is consistent and states of D ′ coincide with some
interpretation on Y and an arbitrary interpretation on X . Since D ′ | Co , E is true at every such state, witnessing that any
truth assignment on X turns the joint assignment on both, Y and X , into a satisfying assignment for E . This proves the
truth of Φ .
For the if-direction let Φ be true. Consider a satisfying truth assignment on Y , and let D ′ be the set of static causal laws
from Dm compliant with this assignment. Then, D ′ is consistent and Du ⊆ D ′ ⊆ Dm . Moreover, since Φ is true, any truth
assignment on X turns the joint assignment on both, Y and X , into a satisfying assignment for E . Therefore, E holds at all
states of D ′ , witnessing D ′ | Co . This proves that D ′ is a pre-solution, and hence the existence of a solution.
Finally, for (iv), let E be a Boolean formula over atoms Y and let us deﬁne Du = {caused Y1 if ¬E, caused ¬Y1 if ¬E},
Dm = {caused Yi, caused ¬Yi | Yi ∈ Y }, I = ∅, and C = ∅. Then, (Du ∪ Dm, I,C,C ) has a solution iff E is satisﬁable.
For the only-if direction, let Du ⊆ D ′ ⊆ Du ∪ Dm be a solution. Then D ′ is consistent and states of D ′ coincide with some
interpretation on Y . Since Du ⊆ D ′ , E is true at every such state. This proves the satisﬁability of E .
For the if-direction let E be satisﬁable. Consider a satisfying truth assignment on Y , and let D ′m be the set of static causal
laws from Dm compliant with this assignment. Then, D ′ = Du ∪ D ′m is consistent and Du ⊆ D ′ ⊆ Du ∪ Dm . Moreover D ′ | Co
trivially. This proves that D ′ is a pre-solution, and hence the existence of a solution. 
Theorem 6. Given an ADU problem (D, I,C,⊂) and an action description D ′ , deciding whether D ′ is a solution for it is
(i) PSPACE-complete for general constraints in Co,
(ii) Π Pk+3-complete if k is the maximal nesting depth of dynamic constraints in Co,
(iii) Π P2 -complete if Co does not involve dynamic constraints, and
(iv) DP -complete if Co = ∅.
Proof. Membership: Follows from Theorem 3, observing that for any given action descriptions D ′ and D ′′ , deciding D ′ ⊂ D ′′
can be done in polynomial time, i.e., that Pcheck is in P for ⊂.
Hardness: Hardness in Case (i) follows from Theorem 4. For (ii) let n = k + 2 and let Φ = ∀Y Q 1X1 · · · Qn Xn E be a QBF,
where Q i = ∃ if i ≡ 1 mod 2 and Q i = ∀ otherwise. Consider
Du = D2 ∪ {caused Yi after Ai−1 ∧ Yi, caused ¬Yi after Ai−1 ∧ ¬Yi | 2 i  n},
where D2 is the action description from the proof of Theorem 4 with l = 1, Dm = {caused Yi, caused ¬Yi | Yi ∈ Y }, I = ∅,
and C = Co = {ALWAYS f ∨ g}, where
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(
. . .
(
pn−1 N p¯n−1 holds E after {An−1}
)
. . .
)
after {A1},
g =
∧
Yi∈Y
SOMETIMES holds Yi ∧ SOMETIMES holds ¬Yi,
where N = necessarily, pi = ¬ if i is odd and void otherwise, for 1  i  n− 1, and p¯n − 1 = ¬ if n is odd and void
otherwise. We show that Du is a solution to the action description update problem (Du ∪ Dm, I,C,⊂) iff Φ is true.
Obviously, Du is consistent and I ⊆ Du . Additionally, states of Du consist of arbitrary truth assignments to Y and
X1, . . . , Xn . Therefore, Du satisﬁes g , and hence Du | Co . This proves that Du is a pre-solution. We show that it is a
maximum pre-solution iff Φ is true.
For the only-if direction, towards a contradiction assume that Φ is false. Then ¬Φ is true. Observe that ¬Φ is a QBF
of the form considered in the hardness proof of Theorem 5(ii) with E negated. Applying the arguments of this proof, we
obtain that there exists a set Du ⊂ D ′ ⊆ Du ∪ Dm , such that D ′ is consistent and D ′, s | f for every state s of D ′ . (Note
that p¯n−1 accounts for the negation of E .) Therefore D ′ | Co , and thus D ′ is a pre-solution. This contradicts the maximality
of Du .
For the if-direction, towards a contradiction assume that Du is not maximal. Then, all states of a maximum solution
coincide on at least one assignment to some Yi ∈ Y , and therefore it does not satisfy g . Consequently, f is satisﬁed at all
states of a maximum solution. Applying the arguments of the hardness proof of Theorem 5(ii), we conclude that ¬Φ is true,
a contradiction.
For (iii) let Φ = ∀Y ∃X E and consider the action description update problem (Du ∪ Dm, I,C,⊂), where Du = ∅, Dm =
{caused Yi, caused ¬Yi | Yi ∈ Y }, I = ∅, and C = Co = {ALWAYS ¬holds E ∨ g}, with g as before. We prove that the action
description update problem (Du ∪ Dm, I,C,⊂) has Du = ∅ as a solution iff Φ is true.
Obviously, Du is consistent and I ⊆ Du . Additionally, states of Du consist of arbitrary truth assignments to Y and X .
Therefore, Du satisﬁes g , and hence Du | Co . This proves that Du is a pre-solution. We show that it is a maximum pre-
solution iff Φ is true.
For the only-if direction, towards a contradiction assume that Φ is false. Then ¬Φ is true. Observe that ¬Φ is a QBF
of the form considered in the hardness proof of Theorem 5(iii) with E negated. Applying the arguments of this proof, we
obtain that there exists a set Du ⊂ D ′ ⊆ Dm , such that D ′ is consistent and D ′ | ALWAYS ¬holds E , i.e., D ′ | Co . Therefore,
D ′ is a pre-solution, which contradicts the maximality of Du .
For the if-direction, towards a contradiction assume that Du is not maximal. Then, all states of a maximum solution
coincide on at least one assignment to some Yi ∈ Y , and therefore it does not satisfy g . Consequently, a maximum solution
must satisfy ALWAYS ¬holds E . Applying the arguments of the hardness proof of Theorem 5(iii), we conclude that ¬Φ is
true, a contradiction.
Finally (iv), let E1 and E2 be Boolean formulas over atoms Y1 and Y2, respectively. Consider Du = {caused ¬F , caused F
if ¬E1}, Dm = {caused F if ¬E2}, I = ∅, and C = ∅. Then, (Du ∪ Dm, I,C,⊂) has solution Du iff E1 is satisﬁable and E2 is
unsatisﬁable.
Obviously, I ⊆ Du , and Du | Co . Therefore, Du is a solution iff it is consistent and maximal, i.e., no superset of Du is
consistent. We show that this two conditions hold iff E1 is satisﬁable and E2 is unsatisﬁable.
For the only-if direction, assume that Du is consistent and maximal. Then E1 is satisﬁable witnessed by the truth
assignment to Y1 of any state of Du . Furthermore, Du ∪ Dm is inconsistent (otherwise it would be a solution, since it
trivially satisﬁes Co), which implies that E2 is unsatisﬁable.
For the if-direction, let E1 be satisﬁable and E2 be unsatisﬁable. Then any satisfying assignment to ﬂuents in Y1 together
with assigning falsity to F and any truth assignment to ﬂuents from Y2 yields a state of Du witnessing its consistency.
Moreover, Du ∪ Dm is inconsistent due to the unsatisﬁability of E2, which implies that Du is maximal. This proves DP -
hardness. 
Theorem 7. Given an ADU problem (D, I,C,<weightq ) and an action description D
′ , deciding whether D ′ is a solution for it is
(i) PSPACE-complete for general constraints in C ,
(ii) Π Pk+3-complete if k is the maximal nesting depth of dynamic constraints in C ,
(iii) Π P2 -complete if C does not involve dynamic constraints, and
(iv) NP-complete if C = ∅.
Proof. Membership: For (i), (ii), and (iii) membership follows from Theorems 3 and 4. Note that in order to decide
D1 <weightq D2 for any action descriptions D1 and D2, such that Du ∪ I ⊆ Di ⊆ D ∪ I for i ∈ {1,2}, and a set of weighted
constraints Cp , we decide Di | c, for every c ∈ Cp (i.e., polynomially many), and sum up the corresponding weights in
polynomial time. Thus, if Di | c can be decided in polynomial space, respectively in polynomial time with the help of a
Σ Pi−1-oracle, then Pcheck is in PSPACE, respectively in 
P
i , for <weightq . For (iv), i.e. C = ∅, Pcheck is trivial for <weightq .
In this case we can decide whether D ′ is a solution by guessing a state s and checking that it is a state of D ′ in polyno-
mial time (witnessing consistency) and additionally checking Du ∪ I ⊆ D ′ and D ′ ⊆ D ∪ I in polynomial time. This proves
NP-membership for (iv).
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Co from the proof of Theorem 6(ii). Additionally, let Cp = {ALWAYS holds Yi,ALWAYS holds ¬Yi | Yi ∈ Y } and consider a
weight of 1 for each c ∈ Cp . Then, Du <weightq D ′ for every Du ⊂ D ′ ⊆ Du ∪ Dm , since weightq(Du) = 0, whereas all states
of D ′ coincide on at least one assignment to some Yi ∈ Y , thus making at least one of the constraints in Cp true, i.e.,
weightq(D
′) 1. Therefore, Du is a solution to (Du ∪ Dm, I,Co ∪ Cp,<weightq ) iff it is a solution to (Du ∪ Dm, I,Co,⊂), which
proves Π Pk+3-hardness (cf. Theorem 6(ii)).
For (iii) consider Φ , D , I , and Co from the proof of Theorem 6(ii). Again, let Cp = {ALWAYS holds Yi,ALWAYS holds ¬Yi |
Yi ∈ Y } with weight 1 for each c ∈ Cp . Then, for the same reason as above, Du <weightq D ′ for every Du ⊂ D ′ ⊆ Du ∪ Dm .
Therefore, Du is a solution to (Du ∪ Dm, I,Co ∪ Cp,<weightq ) iff it is a solution to (Du ∪ Dm, I,Co,⊂), proving Π P2 -hardness.
Finally (iv), let E be a Boolean formula over atoms Y and consider the ADU problem given by Du = {caused Y1 if ¬E,
caused ¬Y1 if ¬E}, Dm = ∅, I = ∅, and C = ∅. Then, Du is a solution to (Du ∪ Dm, I,C,<weightq ) iff E is satisﬁable.
For the only-if direction, let Du be a solution. Then Du is consistent, states of Du coincide with some interpretation on
Y , and E is true at every such state. This proves the satisﬁability of E .
For the if-direction let E be satisﬁable. A satisfying truth assignment on Y is a state of Du , i.e., Du is consistent. Moreover,
Du ∪ I ⊆ Du ⊆ D ∪ I and Du | Co trivially. And since Du ∪ I = Du = D ∪ I , we conclude that Du is a solution. 
Appendix B. Proofs for Section 6
Prior to the proof of Proposition 4, we establish the following lemma which pinpoints the relation between states and
transitions of an update description U and any action description D ′ obtained by an (arbitrary) selection of modiﬁable laws.
Lemma 3. Let D = Du ∪ Dm be an action description, and let D ′m be a subset of Dm. Let 〈S, V , R〉 be the transition diagram described
by D ′ = Du ∪ D ′m. Let U = U (D) be the update description of D, with a set H of update ﬂuents, and let 〈SU , V U , RU 〉 be the transition
diagram described by U . LetM be the subset of H labeling the laws in D ′m. Then the following hold:
(i) s \H ∈ S iff s ∈ SU and s ∩H=M,
(ii) 〈s, A, s′〉 in RU iff s =H s′ , and
(iii) 〈s \H, A, s′ \H〉 ∈ R iff 〈s, A, s′〉 ∈ RU and s ∩H=M.
Proof. (i) For the only-if direction consider any state s ∈ S . By the deﬁnition of a transition diagram described by an action
description, for every static law (4) in D ′ , s satisﬁes G ⊃ L.
Case 1. Take any static law (4) in U , that does not contain any Hi ∈ H. By the deﬁnition of an update description, this static
law is in Du as well. Then, since s satisﬁes G ⊃ L, s ∪M satisﬁes G ⊃ L.
Case 2. Take any static law (15) in U such that Hi ∈M. By the deﬁnition of an update description, there is a corresponding
static law (4) in D ′m . Then, since s satisﬁes G ⊃ L, s ∪M satisﬁes G ∧ Hi ⊃ L.
Case 3. Take any static law (15) in U such that Hi /∈M. Since s ∪M does not satisfy G ∧ Hi , s ∪M satisﬁes G ∧ Hi ⊃ L.
By the deﬁnition of an update description, U does not contain any other static laws. Therefore, from these three cases, it
follows that s ∪M is a state in SU .
For the if-direction consider any state s in SU , such that s ∩ H = M. By the deﬁnition of a transition diagram described
by an action description, for every static law (4) in U , s satisﬁes G ⊃ L.
Case 1. Take any static law (4) in Du . By the deﬁnition of an update description it is also in U , and it does not contain any
element of H. Therefore, s \H satisﬁes G ⊃ L.
Case 2. Take any static law (4) in D ′m . By the deﬁnition of an update description, for every static law (4) in D ′m , there is a
static law (15) in U . Since, for every corresponding static law (15) in U , s satisﬁes G ∧ Hi ⊃ L, and since by assumption Hi
is in s, s \H satisﬁes G ⊃ L.
From these two cases, it follows that, for every static law (4) in D ′ , s \H satisﬁes G ⊃ L. Thus, s \H is in S .
(ii) Since no element of H appears in the head of any causal law in U except for the inertia laws (17), we conclude that
〈s, A, s′〉 in RU iff s =H s′ .
(iii) For the only-if direction consider any 〈s, A, s′〉 in R . By the deﬁnition of a transition diagram described by an action
description, for every dynamic law (5) in D ′ , s′ satisﬁes L if the law is applicable to 〈s, A, s′〉 (i.e., s ∪ A satisﬁes H and s′
satisﬁes G). Due to (i), both s ∪M and s′ ∪M are in SU .
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Case 1. Consider any dynamic law (5) in U , that does not contain any Hi ∈ H. Suppose that it is applicable to 〈s ∪M, A, s′ ∪
M〉. Then, since no Hi ∈ H occurs in this law, it is applicable to 〈s, A, s′〉 as well. By the deﬁnition of an update description,
this law is in Du . Since 〈s, A, s′〉 is in R , s′ satisﬁes L. Then s′ ∪M satisﬁes L.
Case 2. Consider any dynamic law (16) in U , that is not of the form (17), where Hi labels a dynamic law (5) in D ′m , i.e.,
Hi ∈M. Suppose that it is applicable to 〈s ∪M, A, s′ ∪M〉. That is, s ∪M∪ A satisﬁes H ∧ Hi and s′ ∪M satisﬁes G . Since H
does not contain any Hi ∈ H, s ∪ A satisﬁes H ; since G does not contain any Hi ∈ H, s′ satisﬁes G . Then, the corresponding
dynamic law (5) in D ′m is applicable to 〈s, A, s′〉. Since 〈s, A, s′〉 is in R , s′ satisﬁes L. Then, s′ ∪M satisﬁes L.
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Case 3. Consider any dynamic law (17) in U . By (ii) we conclude that 〈s, A, s′〉 in RU iff s =H s′ . Hence, s∪M satisﬁes Hi iff
s′ ∪M satisﬁes Hi . Therefore, this law is applicable to 〈s ∪M, A, s′ ∪M〉 iff L = Hi and Hi is in M, or L = ¬Hi and Hi /∈M.
Consequently, M is the only interpretation on H satisfying the heads of the applicable inertia laws.
By the deﬁnition of an update description, U does not contain any other dynamic laws applicable to 〈s ∪M, A, s′ ∪M〉.
So far we have shown that, (a) for every 〈s, A, s′〉 in R , s′ ∪ M satisﬁes the heads of every dynamic law in U that is
applicable to 〈s ∪M, A, s′ ∪M〉. Moreover, we can observe that (b) for each dynamic law in D ′ applicable to 〈s, A, s′〉, there
is a corresponding law in U applicable to 〈s∪M, A, s′ ∪M〉, and that (c) except for the inertia laws (17), U does not contain
any other dynamic laws applicable to 〈s ∪M, A, s′ ∪M〉.
Since we know that s′ is the only interpretation satisfying the heads of all dynamic laws in D ′ applicable to 〈s, A, s′〉, it
follows from (a)–(c) and Case 3 above, that s′ ∪M is the only interpretation satisfying the heads of all dynamic laws in U
applicable to 〈s ∪M, A, s′ ∪M〉. Therefore, 〈s ∪M, A, s′ ∪M〉 is in RU .
For the if-direction consider any 〈s, A, s′〉 in RU , such that s ∩H= s′ ∩H=M. Due to (i) above, s \H and s′ \H are in S .
By the deﬁnition of a transition diagram described by an action description, for every dynamic law (5) in U , s′ satisﬁes L if
the law is applicable to 〈s, A, s′〉 (i.e., s ∪ A satisﬁes H and s′ satisﬁes G).
Consider any dynamic law (5) in D ′ . Suppose that it is applicable to 〈s \H, A, s′ \H〉. That is, (s \H) ∪ A satisﬁes H and
s′ \H satisﬁes G .
Case 1. This law is in Du . Since G and H do not contain any element of H, s ∪ A satisﬁes H and s′ satisﬁes G , and thus the
law (5) is applicable to 〈s, A, s′〉 as well. By the deﬁnition of an update description, this law is also in U . Since 〈s, A, s′〉 is
in RU , s′ satisﬁes L. Since L does not contain any element of H, s′ \H satisﬁes L.
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Case 2. This law is in D ′m . Since s contains every element Hi of H labeling a dynamic law in D ′m , s ∪ A satisﬁes H ∧ Hi .
By the deﬁnition of an update description, there is a corresponding law (16) in U , which is applicable to 〈s, A, s′〉. Since
〈s, A, s′〉 is in RU , s′ satisﬁes L. Since L does not contain any element of H, s′ \H satisﬁes L.
So far we have shown that, (a) for every 〈s, A, s′〉 in RU , s′ \ H satisﬁes the heads of every dynamic law in D ′ that is
applicable to 〈s \ H, A, s′ \ H〉. Moreover, we can observe that (b) for each dynamic law in U applicable to 〈s, A, s′〉, except
for the inertia laws (17), there is a corresponding law in D ′ applicable to 〈s \H, A, s′ \H〉, and that (c) D ′ does not contain
any other dynamic laws applicable to 〈s \H, A, s′ \H〉.
Since we know that s′ is the only interpretation satisfying the heads of all dynamic laws in U applicable to 〈s, A, s′〉,
it follows from (a)–(c) that s′ \ H is the only interpretation satisfying the heads of all dynamic laws in D ′ applicable to
〈s \H, A, s′ \H〉. Therefore, 〈s \H, A, s′ \H〉 is in R . 
Proposition 4. Let (D, I,C,C ) be an ADU problem, with D = Du ∪ Dm. Let U be the update description of D ∪ I = Du ∪ I ∪ Dm,
and let W denote a subset of Dm containing laws labeled by the elements M ⊆ H in U . Then D ′ = Du ∪ I ∪ W is a pre-solution to
(D, I,C,C ) iff M is an update set for U relative to Co.
Proof. Let (D, I,C,C ) be an ADU problem, with D = Du ∪ Dm . Let U be the update description of D ∪ I = Du ∪ I ∪ Dm ,
with a set H of update ﬂuents, describing the transition diagram T U = 〈SU , V U , RU 〉. Let W be a subset of Dm containing
laws labeled by M⊆ H in U . Let T = 〈S, V , R〉 be the transition diagram described by D ′ = Du ∪ I ∪ W . We show that D ′ is
a pre-solution to (D, I,C,C ) iff M is an update set for U relative to Co .
For the if-direction suppose that M is an update set for U relative to Co . We show that D ′ is a pre-solution to (D, I,C,C ) the deﬁnition of a solution hold.
(i) Since s ∩H=M for some state s ∈ SU , and due to Lemma 3(i), S is not empty. Therefore, D ′ is consistent.
(ii) It follows from the deﬁnition of D ′ that Du ∪ I ⊆ D ′ ⊆ D ∪ I .
(iii) For any state s in S , observe that by Lemma 3(i), s ∪M is in SU .
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We show for any static or dynamic constraint c and any state s in S , that U , s ∪ M | c implies D ′, s | c. Towards a
contradiction assume U , s∪M | c and D ′, s | c, and consider a static constraint c ﬁrst. Since no element of H appears in c,
and the constraint is static, s ∪M | c follows. However, this contradicts the assumption. So let c be a dynamic constraint
and h a history (11) in T such that s0 = s and D ′, sn | Q . We continue by induction on the nesting depth k of c. If k = 0,
then Q is a static constraint and, since no element of H appears in c, it follows that sn ∪M | Q . Moreover, by Lemma 3(iii),
hU = s0 ∪M, A0, s1 ∪M, . . . , sn−1 ∪M, An, sn ∪M
is a history in T U . Thus, we conclude U , s∪M | c, a contradiction. So let us assume the claim holds for dynamic constraints
with maximum nesting depth k − 1, and consider a dynamic constraint of nesting depth k. Then, Q contains only static
constraints and dynamic constraints of nesting depth at most k − 1. By hypothesis, D ′, sn | Q implies U , sn ∪ M | Q .
Furthermore, again by Lemma 3(iii), the history hU corresponding to h is a history in T U . Thus, we conclude U , s∪M | c, a
contradiction. This proves U , s∪M | c implies D ′, s | c for all s in S , and any static or dynamic constraint c, and thus also
for any open constraint c.
We continue considering existential and universal constraints c. We show that if c holds at s ∪ M w.r.t. SUH,s∪M , then
D ′ | c. For an existentially quantiﬁed open constraint Q , the claim follows from the fact that, by deﬁnition, if c holds at
s ∪M w.r.t. SUH,s∪M , some s′ ∈ SU exists such that U , s′ | Q and s′ =H s. By Lemma 3(i), we conclude that s′ \ H is a state
of D ′ . Moreover, from U , s′ | Q and the fact that Q is open, it follows that D ′, s′ \H | Q , and hence D ′ | c. So let c be a
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universally quantiﬁed open constraint Q , and towards a contradiction, assume that D ′ | c. Then, there exists a state s′ of
D ′ such that D ′, s′ | Q . Note that by Lemma 3(i) s′ ∪M ∈ SU . Moreover, since Q is open we conclude that U , s′ ∪M | Q
(otherwise D ′, s′ | Q follows which is in contradiction with our assumption). However, U , s′ ∪ M | Q contradicts that c
holds at s ∪ M w.r.t. SUH,s∪M . Therefore, if c holds at s ∪ M w.r.t. SUH,s∪M , then D ′ | c for every existential and universal
constraint c; the same follows for any Boolean combination of existential and universal constraints. This proves that if c
holds at s ∪M w.r.t. SUH,s∪M , then D ′ | c, for any constraint c.
Finally, we show that D ′ | Co . Consider an arbitrary s ∈ S (which exists, since by (i) D ′ is consistent). Then, due to
Condition (ii) for update ﬂuent sets, s ∪M ∈ SUCo . This means by deﬁnition that c holds at s w.r.t. SUH,s for every c ∈ Co . As
we have shown above, this implies D ′ | c for all c ∈ Co . This proves D ′ | Co .
For the only-if direction let D ′ be a pre-solution to (D, I,C,C ). We show that M is an update set for U relative to Co ,
i.e., (i) s ∩H=M for some s ∈ SU , and (ii) SUH,s ⊆ SUCo .
(i) Since D ′ is consistent there exists a state s ∈ S . Furthermore, by Lemma 3(i) we conclude that s ∪ M ∈ SU , for any
such state s.
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Fig. 14. The sample constraint given in Section 7.1 for updating the Zoo World into a little Circus, expressed as a query in CCalc.
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Fig. 16. A possible scenario which shows that the constraint of Fig. 15 is satisﬁed by the Zoo World (i.e., the Zoo World can be updated into a little Circus)
if we remove the causal laws labeled by aux2(bart, homer, jumbo) and aux3(bart, homer, jumbo).
(ii) We ﬁrst show for any static or dynamic constraint c and any state s in S , that D ′, s | c implies U , s∪M | c. Towards
a contradiction assume D ′, s | c and U , s ∪M | c, and consider a static constraint c ﬁrst. Since no element of H appears
in c, and the constraint is static, s | c follows. However, this contradicts the assumption D ′, s | c. So let c be a dynamic
constraint and hU a history (11) in T U such that s0 = s∪M and U , sn | Q . We continue by induction on the nesting depth
k of c. If k = 0, then Q is a static constraint and, since no element of H appears in c, it follows that sn \H | Q . Furthermore,
by Lemma 3(ii), si =H s0 for 1 i  n. Therefore, by Lemma 3(iii),
h = s0 \H, A0, s1 \H, . . . , sn−1 \H, An, sn \H
is a history in T . Thus, we conclude D ′, s | c, a contradiction. So let us assume the claim holds for dynamic constraints with
maximum nesting depth k−1, and consider a dynamic constraint of nesting depth k. Then, Q contains only static constraints
and dynamic constraints of nesting depth at most k−1. By hypothesis, U , sn | Q implies D ′, sn \H | Q . Furthermore, again
by Lemma 3(ii) and (iii), the history h corresponding to hU is a history in T . Thus, we conclude D ′, s | c, a contradiction.
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Fig. 18. The sample constraint to check that Snoopy and Abu can exchange hats.
Fig. 19. The sample constraint to check that Snoopy and Abu can exchange hats, if we remove the causal laws labeled by aux4 from the description in
Fig. 17.
T. Eiter et al. / Artiﬁcial Intelligence 174 (2010) 1172–1221 1219Fig. 20. A possible scenario to show that the sample constraint to check that Snoopy and Abu can exchange hats is satisﬁed by the description in Fig. 17 if
we remove the causal laws labeled by aux4.
This proves D ′, s | c implies U , s ∪M | c for all s in S , and any static or dynamic constraint c, and thus also for any open
constraint c.
We continue considering existential and universal constraints c. Let s be any state in SU such that s ∩H=M. We show
that D ′ | c implies that c holds at s w.r.t. SUH,s . For an existentially quantiﬁed open constraint Q , the claim follows from the
fact that then there exists a state s′ ∈ S , such that D ′, s′ | Q . By Lemma 3(i) s′ ∪M is a state in SU , and since Q is open, it
follows that U , s′ ∪M | Q . Moreover s′ ∪M=H s, and hence, c holds at s w.r.t. SUH,s by deﬁnition. So let c be a universally
quantiﬁed open constraint Q , and towards a contradiction, assume that c does not hold at s w.r.t. SUH,s . Then there exists
s′ ∈ SUH,s , such that U , s′ | Q . By Lemma 3(i) s′ \M is a state of D ′ , and since Q is open, D ′, s | Q follows. However, this
contradicts D ′ | c. Therefore, if D ′ | c, then c holds at s w.r.t. SUH,s for every existential and universal constraint c; the
same follows for any Boolean combination of existential and universal constraints. This proves that D ′ | c implies that c
holds at s w.r.t. SUH,s .
Therefore, given that D ′ is a pre-solution and hence D ′ | Co , we conclude that SUH,s ⊆ SUCo . 
Appendix C. The Zoo World in C
The Zoo World was described in the action language C+ and presented in the language of CCalc in [1], in ﬁve parts:
animals (zoo-animals), movement (zoo-movement), actions (zoo-actions), landscape (zoo-landscape), as well
as their union (zoo). We have transformed the ﬁrst three components into C (in the language of CCalc as well)12 as
shown in Figs. 8–13, by replacing the non-Boolean ﬂuents of the form pos(Animal)= Position with Boolean ﬂuents
pos(Animal,Position), and by adding several causal laws to make sure that they express the same ﬂuent13:
constraint[\/P | pos(ANML,P)].
caused -pos(ANML,P) if pos(ANML,P1) & P\ = {P}1.
The ﬁrst three forms of causal laws in Fig. 13 constitute the modiﬁable part Dm of this description. The sample constraint
given in Section 7.1 can be represented by the CCalc query given in Fig. 14.
Appendix D. Exchanging hats in the Circus
Consider a Circus world including monkeys and dogs, where only monkeys can exchange hats with each other. We can
obtain a C description of this world, from the C+ description of missionaries and cannibals exchanging hats [50], and
present it to CCalc as in Fig. 17.
Now consider a variation of the Zoo World described in Section 7.1, which involves also monkeys and dogs, where only
monkeys can exchange hats. This variation of the Zoo World can be described by the union of the Zoo World description
D1 discussed in Section 7.1 (Figs. 8–13) and the description D0 mentioned above (Fig. 17).
Suppose that we would like to update the action description D0 ∪ D1 of this extended Zoo World, to obtain a description
of a Circus where not only humans can mount on each other who further can mount on a large animal, but also animals can
exchange hats with each other. Assume that the modiﬁable part D1m of D
1 is the same as in Section 7.1, and the modiﬁable
part of D0m of D
0 consists of the last causal law in Fig. 17. The sample constraint given in Section 7.2 can be represented by
the CCalc query in Fig. 18. (See also Figs. 19 and 20.)
12 The input language of CCalc is explained at its manual at http://www.cs.utexas.edu/users/tag/cc/, with further examples.
13 In CCalc an expression of the form constraint G is called a constraint; it is shorthand for the causal law caused False if ¬G .
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